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IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, a new plan for monetary  union in Europe has 
gained  widespread  popularity.  The  plan  has  also  invigorated  the initiative 
to build a single currency area among European Community (EC) 
countries-an  initiative  that has been a recurrent  feature  of the debate 
on European  monetary  policy throughout  the postwar  period. Indeed, 
many  observers now believe that the achievement  of a monetary  union 
is highly  likely:  C. Fred  Bergsten  states that  Western  Europe  is "almost 
certain [emphasis added] to go beyond 'completion of the internal 
market'  to an Economic and  Monetary  Union, or EMU." ' 
The policy problems  related  to monetary  reform  are determined  by 
the approach  taken  to reform.  In  the late 1960s,  two alternative  strategies 
were much debated; surprisingly,  they have received little attention 
recently. The first program, known as the gradualist strategy (the 
supporters  of which have been labeled "economists"), relies on pro- 
gressive removal of  trade barriers, convergence of  inflation rates, 
progressive stability of exchange rates, and parallel modification  of 
monetary policies and institutions. The second strategy involves a 
sudden currency reform (its supporters  have been labeled "monetar- 
ists"). This strategy amounts to either the irrevocable  locking of ex- 
change  rates, with the elimination  of target  zones, or the replacement  of 
national currencies with a single currency. Both possibilities would 
require  a common  central  bank  to manage  the system. 
This project benefited from discussions with Mario Sarcinelli, William Branson, 
Richard  Baldwin,  Kenneth  Froot, Michael  Gavin, Luigi  Spaventa,  and Bruce  Lehmann. 
Any errors,  opinions, and omissions are my own. I am indebted  to the Italian  Ministry 
of the Treasury  for providing  the data for this study. 
1. Bergsten  (1990,  p. 97). 
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The  current  plan  for  monetary  union,  the so-called  Delors  plan,  largely 
reflects the view of the "economists."2 Significantly,  the Delors plan 
does not set deadlines for monetary union, nor does it demand that 
certain  criteria  be met in order  to move from  one stage to the next in the 
institutional  reform.  As a result, and despite an early show of support, 
it is not clear how much commitment  exists for this plan, even among 
the  continental  governments  that  are  members  ofthe European  Monetary 
System (EMS). 
How might  the current  plan for monetary  union become successful? 
In the absence of new institutional  developments, the convergence of 
inflationary  expectations and the stability  of exchange rates are neces- 
sary conditions for the success of the gradualist  strategy. This paper 
discusses the problem  of achieving  and sustaining  these twin objectives 
and, more  broadly,  the Delors plan's chance for success. I consider  the 
historical  and institutional  background  for European  monetary  union: 
the monetary  arrangements  of the postwar  period, the early attempts  at 
achieving  monetary  cohesion, and  the characteristics  of the Delors  plan. 
I also address the extent to which inflationary  expectations have con- 
verged among France, Germany,  and Italy, and what this implies for 
monetary  reform. 
Western  European  countries  have been talking  about  monetary  union 
for three  decades now. An understanding  of the historical  developments 
surrounding  monetary  union  reveals  much  about  the nature  and  potential 
success of the current initiative. I deal with these issues in the first 
section of the paper. In the second section, I focus on the experiences 
of the three  largest  countries  involved  in  the debate  on monetary  union- 
France, Germany,  and Italy. All three have been members  of the EMS 
since its inception.  This section explores  the question  of convergence  of 
inflationary  and exchange  rate expectations, which can be gauged  from 
the behavior  of both wages and, especially, interest rates. In the third 
section, I use alternative models to examine the empirical evidence 
presented  for France, Germany,  and Italy. The main  questions  are how 
much  does the pegging  of exchange  rates contribute  to the convergence 
of inflation rates and interest rates, and how credible is a plan for 
monetary  union  that  hinges  on the pegging?  One  noticeable  result  of this 
2. The study  by the Committee  for  the Study  of Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (1989) 
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section-a  result that has potentially important  implications for the 
theory of exchange rate regimes and optimum  currency  areas-is  that 
pronouncing  exchange  rates to be fixed may not eliminate  distortions  in 
real interest rates and real wages. The fourth section discusses the 
current  prospects  for monetary  union  in light  of the evidence presented, 
and  is followed by some general  conclusions. 
Throughout  the paper,  I assume that  the goal of monetary  union  is to 
converge  to the low level of inflation  in Germany.  This attitude  is widely 
reflected  in all official  documents  and  has arguably  justified  the cohesion 
of the EMS. 
Renewed Momentum toward Monetary Union 
References to economic and monetary  union appear  as early as the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957.  The accelerating  pace of negotiations  seen in 
the past 18 months should be set against the background  of previous 
attempts  at achieving  monetary  cohesion. Such an exercise should  also 
help assess the prospects  of the current  efforts  in light  of earlier  failures. 
Exchange rate developments of the past 30 years are depicted in fig- 
ure 1. The figure  shows the real  bilateral  exchange  rates  of one deutsche 
mark  relative to the U.S. dollar, the French franc, and the Italian  lira, 
and summarizes the monetary arrangements  of the three European 
countries  in the past 30 years. 
The Treaty of Rome advocated, together with the creation of a 
common  market  for goods, the removal  of exchange  controls  in tandem 
with the liberalization  of goods markets.  The treaty also recommended 
that exchange rate changes by member countries be elevated to the 
status  of "matters  of common  interest." These statements  of principle, 
however,  proved  ineffective  in  practice.  The exchange  rate  realignments 
of the deutsche mark  in March 1961,  the French  franc in August 1969, 
and  the deutsche  mark  again  in October  1969  were unilateral  decisions.3 
Except in these cases, the stability of intra-European  exchange rates 
before 1971  was assured  by pegging  each currency  to the dollar. 
3. Sterling  was devalued  in November 1967,  but at the time the United  Kingdom  was 
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Figure 1.  The Italian Lira, French Franc, and U.S.  Dollar Relative 
to the Deutsche Mark,  1959-89a 
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Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics. 
a.  The figure shows  an exchange  rate index,  with January 1959 =  100. Exchange  rates were calculated as the unit 
of foreign currency per deutsche  mark. 
b.  Ticks represent January of the year indicated. 
The First Attempt 
The response of the European Community  to the deutsche mark 
realignment,  and to the unfolding  of the crisis in the Bretton Woods 
regime, was a solemn statement  by the heads of state at the European 
Summit  held at The Hague  in December 1969.  The statement  expressed 
the desire  to see the Community  develop  into  an economic  and  monetary 
union through  the implementation  of a phased plan. Some views ex- 
pressed at the time have been echoed in the current  debate-with  the 
French advocating  a sudden locking of parities and the elimination  of 
fluctuation  bands and the Germans  preferring  a gradual  approach, in 
which  the convergence  of macroeconomic  structure  and  performance  is 
a precondition  for monetary  union.4 
The summit  appointed  a committee,  headed  by Pierre  Werner,  prime 
4.  At that  time,  the "monetarist"  and  "economist"  labels  were  created  to characterize 
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minister  and finance minister of Luxembourg,  to report on practical 
steps  for achieving  economic  and  monetary  union.  The resulting  Werner 
report  argued  that monetary  union must occur in three stages.' During 
the first  two stages, coordination  of economic  policy had  to be strength- 
ened. The process of coordination  would combine prior consultation 
with follow-up  monitoring.  The second stage was further  characterized 
by the creation  of a "European  Fund  for Monetary  Cooperation,"  which 
would "progressively  manage  Community  reserves" and  would  manage 
intra-European  balance-of-payments  financing. This fund would be 
integrated,  in the third  stage, into a system of Community  central  banks. 
Parity  readjustments  were ruled  out for the second stage. In particular, 
the Werner  committee  concluded  that: 
The ultimate  objective . ..  appears  to be one that can be attained  within the 
present  decade, provided  that it continues  to enjoy the political  support  of the 
governments....  The adoption  of a single currency  could be the final  stage of 
this union, ensuring  the irreversibility  of the process.6 
The Werner  report  was the outcome of heated debates that saw the 
French  government,  with  its strong  aversion  to any  institutional  changes 
that would limit national  sovereignty, pitted against  the five remaining 
countries,  which favored some transfer  of power to a European  institu- 
tion and changes in the Treaty  of Rome. In the end, the nations agreed 
to leave many details about intermediate  stages unspecified  and focus 
on the first  stage and  the final  objective, which was safely in the distant 
future. 
On March  22, 1971,  the EC Council  of Ministers  signed  a resolution 
adopting  the Werner  report  and  laying  down a timetable  for the reforms 
needed to enhance the integration  of goods and financial  markets.7  On 
the policy side, the resolution  advocated  more  power for the Monetary 
5. The Werner report, officially entitled "Resolution of the Council and of the 
Representatives  of the Governments  of the Member  States  of March  1971,"  is recorded  in 
Monetary  Committee  of the European  Communities  (1986). 
6.  See introduction  to  Werner report in Monetary Committee of the European 
Communities  (1986). 
7. The first  stage  would  start  in January  1971  and  last no more  than  three  years. From 
January  1, 1974,  VAT  and  excise taxes as well as taxes on dividends  and  interest  would  be 
harmonized.  Also, the EC would  work  to harmonize  "those kinds  of tax which  are likely 
to have a direct influence on capital movements within the Community."  Efforts to 
harmonize  corporate  taxes would  also take  place. 
The  EC  also planned  the progressive  liberalization  of capital  markets  and  the improved 
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Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors. It also 
recommended  a narrowing  of fluctuation  bands  for exchange  rates. 
Two months  later  foreign  exchange markets  provided  the conditions 
for the effective meltdown of the Werner plan. Germany called an 
emergency meeting of EC finance ministers to propose floating the 
deutsche mark. The French opposed the idea and advocated tighter 
capital controls. No agreement  was reached at the meeting;  the mark 
and the guilder  were floated, while all other countries  tightened  capital 
controls. Ironically,  some of the tax reforms  called  for in March  1971- 
capital  income taxation  and  corporate  taxes-still  have to be tackled  by 
the European  Community. 
Monetaty  Initiatives  of the 1970s 
Figure  1  also shows that  the collapse of the "North  Atlantic"  Bretton 
Woods system was followed by dramatic  exchange rate fluctuations, 
during  which  the franc  and  the lira  have progressively  diverged  from  the 
dollar.  Neither  of the currencies  has regained  its stability,  relative  to the 
mark,  that characterized  the dollar-based  regime  of the 1960s. 
The European  monetary  initiatives  of the rest of the 1970s  are better 
known. From April 1972 to March 1973, the "snake in the tunnel" 
strategy  was in effect: the tunnel representing  the bilateral  fluctuation 
margins  with  the dollar  (4.5 percent)  and  the snake  the narrower  margins 
of intra-European  rates (2.25  percent).  After  March  1973,  the European 
currencies floated freely against the dollar. After that point, the only 
stable  members  of the snake  were Germany,  Belgium,  the Netherlands, 
and  Luxembourg.  The other  large  EC countries,  France  and  Italy, soon 
left  the system-in  January  1974  and  February  1973,  respectively.  France 
briefly  rejoined  from  July 1975  to March  1976. 
The European  Monetary  System was set up in December 1978  and 
became effective in March  1979.  Its exchange  rate mechanism  included 
all EC members  except the United Kingdom.  Jacques  Delors has noted 
that  the EMS  was based on intergovernmental  agreement  rather  than  on 
Community  law.8  While explicit references  to economic and monetary 
union  seem absent,  the EMS  was regarded  as instrumental  to further  EC 
integration. 
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The  purpose  of the European  Monetary  System  is to establish  a greater  measure 
of monetary  stability  in the Community.  It should be seen as a fundamental 
component  of a more comprehensive strategy aimed at lasting growth with 
stability,  a progressive  return  to full employment,  the harmonization  of living 
standards  and the lessening of regional  disparities  within  the Community.  The 
Monetary  System  will facilitate  the convergence  of economic  development  and 
give fresh  impetus  to the process of European  Union.9 
Whether  the EMS  actually  provided  that "fresh  impetus"  is not clear. 
Its success has been mainly reflected in the fact that changes in intra- 
European  exchange rates became a matter  of truly common concern. 
As a result, bilateral  rates  in Europe  have fluctuated  less than  the dollar, 
despite  the differences  in trends (see figure  1). The success of the EMS 
has certainly contributed  to the serious consideration  being given to 
extending  the reach and depth of the experiment. But as Marcello de 
Cecco and I note, the EMS, by itself, has not induced changes in 
monetary  institutions  that sustain  closer cooperation:  two of the EMS's 
technical  features  that  were designed  with  that  objective-the  European 
Monetary  Cooperation  Fund and the European  currency  unit (ECU)- 
did  not achieve the status  originally  envisaged  by their supporters.  '0 
The Delors  Report 
The roots of the most recent  project  for monetary  union-the  Delors 
report-are not in the monetary  area. Unlike the initiative  that  led to the 
Werner  report, which could be viewed as a last-resort  effort to brace 
against  a collapsing  monetary  system, the Delors report  grew out of the 
June 1985 White Paper on the completion of the internal  market  and 
the 1986  Single  European  Act. The former  laid out the " 1992"  plan;  the 
latter was the outcome of an intergovernmental  conference held in 
Luxembourg  in December 1985 to modify the Treaty of Rome. The 
treaty  now includes  a formal  commitment  to complete  the 1992  plan  and 
make several institutional  changes to facilitate its completion. These 
9. So concluded  the Presidency  of the European  Council  in 1978;  see de Cecco and 
Giovannini  (1989,  p. 2). 
10. See de Cecco and  Giovannini  (1989).  By contrast,  Michael  Emerson  (1982)  claims 
that  the EMS  has significantly  affected  the institutional  development  of the Community, 
in that it has "brought  a major  policy function back into the Community  setting, as 
compared  to the snake mechanism  that had left it. It has linked together  Community 
monetary  and public  finance  mechanisms,  and its economic policy coordination  proce- 
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changes include extension of qualified-majority  voting to about two- 
thirds  of the draft  directives that make up the 1992  plan and increased 
involvement  of the European  Parliament.  A crucial  pillar  of the single 
market  program  is the liberalization  of capital  flows within  the Commu- 
nity.  This  was achieved  early  with  the  June  1988  adoption,  by the Council 
of Economic and Finance Ministers  (ECOFIN), of a draft  proposal  on 
the creation  of a European  financial  area. In the same month,  the heads 
of state commissioned a study on the achievement of economic and 
monetary union from a group of central bankers and outside experts 
headed by Jacques Delors. The group presented its results at the 
European  Council  meeting  in Madrid  in June 1989. 
The Delors report  guides the current  debate on monetary  union. Its 
main feature is the concept of gradualism:  monetary union is to be 
achieved  over time so that  the economies and the necessary institutions 
can adapt. Several reasons are given for the gradualist  strategy. First, 
the mandate  to the Delors committee explicitly asked for a plan that 
would achieve the "progressive  realization  of economic and monetary 
union." Sudden monetary  reform was politically unacceptable  in the 
summer  of 1988. Second, monetary  union is seen as part of a broader 
plan that includes the completion of the internal  market. This view is 
inspired by optimal-currency-area  arguments: sufficient mobility of 
goods and  factors  is a precondition  for monetary  union.  Third,  monetary 
union  needs time  to create  new institutions,  including  a European  central 
bank. 
The gradual plan proceeds in three stages. In stage one,  capital 
movements among all countries (except Spain, Greece, and Portugal) 
are fully liberalized.  Membership  in the Exchange Rate Mechanism  of 
the EMS is enlarged.  And, monetary  policy cooperation  is improved  by 
giving  more  powers to the EC Committee  of Central  Bank  Governors  in 
order to facilitate so-called ex ante coordination  of monetary  policies. 
Exchange  rate  realignments  are permitted  during  this first  stage. 
In stage two, which would take place several years in the future,  the 
European  System of Central  Banks (ESCB) replaces the Committee  of 
Central  Bank  Governors  and  the European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund. 
Exchange  rates  are  virtually  fixed, with  realignments  allowed  only under 
exceptional  circumstances,  and  monetary  policy is set at the Community 
level, with  the implicit  understanding  that  national  authorities  follow the 
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ECSB replaces the national  central  banks. At the end of stage three (a 
possible stage  four  itself) a single  currency  would  be adopted. 
The Delors report also deals with a number of measures in the 
economic  field.  Most  important  are  the completion  of the internal  market 
program  and increased macroeconomic  policy coordination,  in partic- 
ular budgetary discipline achieved  through "precise  quantitative 
guidelines."  "I 
The report  does not specify deadlines  although  the developments  of 
the last year  have provided  some. At the European  Council  in  June 1989, 
the heads of state agreed  to embark  on the first  stage of the Delors plan. 
It was a significant  step; as stated in the Delors report, "Although  this 
process is set out in stages which  guide  the progressive  movement  to the 
final objective, the decision to enter upon the first stage should be a 
decision to embark  on the entire  process." 12 At the Strasbourg  Summit 
of December  1989,  it was agreed  that  two intergovernmental  conferences 
would convene by December 1990-one  to prepare  the changes in the 
Treaty of Rome needed for monetary union; the other to deal with 
political union. At the European  Summit  in Dublin in April 1990, the 
heads  of state  declared  that  the changes  in the treaty  relating  to economic 
and  monetary  union  must  be ratified  by national  governments  before  the 
end of 1992.  Hence, stage two of the Delors plan may begin in January 
1993. 
The Delors report  was not motivated  by an analysis of the costs and 
benefits of a monetary  union in Europe, although subsequent studies 
have addressed some of  these issues.'3 A  study by  the European 
Commission,  entitled One Market,  One Money, assesses the economic 
impact  of the EMU  resulting  from  several  different  policy  developments, 
including  elimination  of transactions  costs and foreign exchange risk 
premiums;  achievement  of price  stability  through  an  independent  central 
bank;  G7  coordination  of exchange  rates  and  distribution  of world  foreign 
exchange reserves and seigniorage gains; concern about budgetary 
policy;  and  loss of the exchange  rate  instrument  to offset country-specific 
11. I discuss  the fiscal  problems  of monetary  union  in a later  section. 
12. Delors  report  (para.  39);  see Committee  for the Study  of Economic  and  Monetary 
Union  (1989,  p. 31). 
13. Padoa  Schioppa  (1988)  was perhaps  the first  public  official  to advocate  a modifi- 
cation  of the EMS toward  a monetary  union. He argued  that  the integration  of goods and 
financial  markets  brought  about  by the single  market  program  would make  the EMS too 
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shocks.'4  The study relies on a series of partial  equilibrium  analyses of 
different  markets, and appropriately  refrains  from producing  a single 
summary  quantification  of the effects of monetary  union. 
Estimation  of the  welfare  effects  of a single  currency,  a classic  question 
in international  economics, hinges heavily on what is known about the 
demand  for different  currencies  in an integrated  area.  15  That  knowledge 
is,  at best,  limited. Although this is  an active area of research, a 
comprehensive analysis is still beyond reach.16  In addition, political 
considerations  play  an  important  role in the discussion  of the desirability 
of a monetary  union, as Robert  Triffin  emphasized.  17 Hence this paper 
focuses on the process toward  monetary  union, taking  the desirability 
of the final  objective as given. 
Difference  between Delors  and  Werner Reports 
To an observer with no training  in the language  of diplomacy, the 
Delors report  looks extremely  similar  to the Werner  report.  The latter  is 
also made  up of three stages-during the first stage policy coordination 
would be enhanced; during  the second stage a "European  Monetary 
Fund" would  be set up;  and  during  the third  stage  exchange  rates  would 
be irrevocably  locked. During  the first  two stages, exchange  rate  adjust- 
ments would be allowed, though they should be unnecessary by the 
second stage. Furthermore,  the Werner  report contains several eco- 
nomic measures including  the joint setting of both the medium-term 
objectives for macroeconomic  policies and the broad  outlines of short- 
term policies, and common agreement  on the acceptable margins  for 
national  budget  totals and on the method of financing  deficits. Finally, 
both reports  discuss the need to set up a European  central  bank.  18 
Their marked similarities  suggest several questions: Is the Delors 
report  any "better" than the Werner  report?  Why has the more recent 
plan  for monetary  reform  enjoyed  greater  success? Have changes  in the 
14. Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990). 
15. Mundell  (1968);  McKinnon  (1963);  Kenen  (1969);  Cooper  (1976). 
16. See, in particular,  Bertola  (1989)  and  Canzoneri  and  Rogers  (1990).  A wide-ranging 
discussion  of the economic  effects of EMU is in Eichengreen  (1990). 
17. Triffin  (1960). 
18. The  respective  discussions  are  labeled  "Community  Systemforthe  Central  Banks" 
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European  political  and economic climate  made  the prospects  for mone- 
tary  union  brighter  for the 1990s  than  they were for the 1970s? 
The  first  question  must  have  been raised  within  the Delors  committee. 
The first  of the papers  published  with the report  addresses  precisely  this 
question.  19  The authors  point out a number  of technical  problems  with 
the Werner  report,  such as a "lack of safeguards  against  lapses in policy 
consensus," "institutional  ambiguities," and a "lack of internal  mo- 
mentum.  " But, the differences  in the the two reports'  respective  political 
and economic environments, as Gunther Baer and Tommasa Padoa 
Schioppa  stress, must  have played  a major  role in the weaknesses of the 
Werner  report. 
Political  Factors 
Observers  have long noted that  the 1986  Single  European  Act, which 
was the culmination  of the EC integration  process and  which  put  forward 
the 1992  program,  would have important  political consequences. The 
political  significance  of the act has been evidenced by the heated  debate 
between the United Kingdom and the other European governments 
regarding  the way to complete the internal  market.20  Until last year, 
though, increased economic integration  of the European  Community 
had  always preceded  stronger  political  cohesion.21 
With  the events of 1989,  however, political  cohesion no longer  takes 
its lead  just from  stronger  economic ties, but has gained  a strength  of its 
own. The dismembering  of the communist world has decreased the 
strategic  significance  of ties with the United States and  has provided  the 
conditions for an acceleration of European integration.  An anecdote 
about  how the 1990  intergovernmental  conference  was convened helps 
illustrate  the new interplay  of political and economic elements in the 
negotiations.22  Up to the day before the start  of the Strasbourg  Summit 
in December 1989,  German  economic officials  were unwilling  to see an 
intergovernmental  conference on monetary union called during the 
19. Baer  and  Padoa  Schioppa  (1989). 
20. See, for example,  Wolf  (1989). 
21. In the 1960s the political issues tended to surface in the context of economic 
discussions. A good example is the defense of European  monetary  independence  by 
Giscard  d'Estaing  (1969)  and, before  him, Rueff  (1967),  which  was based  on the desire  to 
take  away  seigniorage  from  the United  States. 
22. This  anecdote  is based  on discussions  with  members  of the German  delegation. 228  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1990 
following three years; yet, at the end of the meeting, the monetary 
conference  was convened for December 1990.  This drastic  reversal  was 
most likely obtained  in exchange  for the support  of German  unification 
by the Community  governments. 
In summary,  the differences in the world strategic scenario, and in 
particular  the difference  in the  political  relations  among  European  states, 
may provide a more favorable environment  for European monetary 
reform  than  was the case in the early  seventies. The  risk  is that  increased 
cross-border competition arising from the removal of controls will 
amplify  political frictions among Western European  governments  and 
bring  the integration  plan to a halt. This prospect could be labeled the 
"Ridley scenario." 
Economic  Factors 
The differences between the economic conditions of the European 
Community  in the 1990s  and in the 1970s  derive from two phenomena. 
The first is economic integration.  Table 1 reports  trade  data for the six 
original members of the EC and shows the imports and exports to 
Community  countries  as a fraction  of imports  and exports to the rest of 
the world. By 1989,  the only countries  for which  intra-Community  trade 
has not swamped  external  trade  are  Germany  (intra-Community  imports 
are 110  percent  of imports  from  the rest of the world, the same  figure  for 
exports is 120 percent) and Italy. All six countries have experienced 
steady  growth  in intra-Community  trade  since the 1960s.  The  differences 
between 1970  and 1989  are not dramatic,  however, except for perhaps 
France and Italy. Economic integration  will be further boosted by 
completion of the internal  market. Indeed, the Commission suggests 
that a double feedback is at work between the single market  program 
and monetary  union, in that a single currency  would help achieve more 
integrated  markets.  Yet, whether  the 1990  Europe  of twelve countries  is 
a more integrated  economy than the 1970  Europe  of six countries  is an 
open question. 
The second economic  phenomenon  that  differentiates  the 1990s  from 
the 1970s  is the liberalization  of financial  markets.  Historical  experience 
suggests  that  all fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  have been characterized  by 
extensive use of capital controls.23  These controls were justified by a 
23. See, for example,  Giovannini  (1989). Alberto Giovannini  229 
Table 1.  Intra-Community Trade Relative to Trade with the Rest of the World, 
Original EC Countries, 1960, 1970, 1989a 
Percent 
1960  1970  1989b 
Exports 
Belgium  and Luxembourg  154.5  302.7  303.1 
France  63.0  139.6  162.7 
Germany  67.0  98.9  120.2 
Italy  66.7  107.1  144.6 
Netherlands  158.2  266.3  309.6 
Imports 
Belgium  and Luxembourg  131.0  196.0  239.1 
France  53.5  126.7  189.0 
Germany  66.3  106.3  109.8 
Italy  58.1  91.3  133.3 
Netherlands  118.1  172.7  158.9 
Source:  European Economy,  November  1989. 
a. The table  reports  each country's  imports  and exports  to EC countries  as a percent  of imports  and exports  to 
the rest of the world. 
b. Figures  for 1989  are estimated  using  incomplete  data. 
desire to stem speculative attacks on central banks' reserves. The 
complete removal of capital controls will force European  countries  to 
create  a new institutional  arrangement  to ensure  closer monetary  policy 
cooperation,  since without  cooperation  fixed parities  would very likely 
collapse.24 
In summary,  there  are  reasons  to believe  that,  even though  the Werner 
report and the Delors report have many similarities,  the chances for 
monetary  reform  in Europe  in the 1990s  are significantly  better  than  they 
were in the 1970s.  Yet, a monetary  union  is by no means  guaranteed.  In 
the following section I review the recent experience of the present 
monetary  system and introduce  economic problems  raised  by the grad- 
ualist  project  of monetary  union. 
Review of the Recent Experience 
This section presents  empirical  evidence on the behavior  of inflation 
and interest rates relative to exchange rates, with special attention  to 
the past three years. For several reasons, I limit the discussion to the 
24. This  argument  is advanced  by Padoa  Schioppa  (1988). 230  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
experiences of France and Italy relative to Germany.  First, these two 
countries  are  Germany's  two largest  trading  partners  and  therefore  carry 
a lot of political  weight  in the current  negotiations  on monetary  reform. 
Second, France  and  Italy  have participated  in the exchange  rate  arrange- 
ment since its inception-unlike  Spain and the United Kingdom, for 
example-and  started from rather  divergent initial conditions. Third, 
the two are  unlike  the small  countries,  whose openness  vis-a-vis  the rest 
of the EC makes monetary  reform  less questionable. Fourth, several 
aspects of France  and Italy's recent experience  can be applied  to other 
countries. 
Figures  2 and 3 plot the French  franc-deutsche  mark  and the Italian 
lira-deutsche  mark  exchange  rates during  the EMS, together  with their 
respective  bilateral  fluctuation  margins.  The discrete  movements  of the 
bilateral  fluctuation  margins  occur at the dates of realignment  of central 
parities.25 Figure  4 plots the monthly  percent  changes in these bilateral 
exchange  rates since June 1973. 
The figures reveal a number of facts.  First, the EMS period is 
characterized  by trends in bilateral  exchange rates. These trends are 
somewhat  broken  in the case of the franc, but appear  largely  accommo- 
dated by adjustments  in bilateral  parities  in the case of the lira. Only in 
the  past  three  years  has  the tendency  of the  franc  and  the  lirato  depreciate 
against  the mark  subsided. Correspondingly,  the frequency  of realign- 
ments  is shown to have decreased  recently. 
Despite the presence of trends, especially in the early years of the 
EMS, figure  4 highlights  a second empirical  regularity:  the variability  of 
bilateral  exchange rates has decreased since the start  of the EMS (the 
vertical  line at March  1979  marks  the start  of the EMS). This impression 
is confirmed  by statistical  tests. Nonparametric  tests indicate that the 
volatility  of total  and  unanticipated  exchange  rate  changes  has  decreased 
since the formation  of the EMS.26 
Finally, the three figures  suggest that both the volatility  of the intra- 
European exchange rates and the tendency of the franc and lira to 
denreciate  against  the mark  have decreased  since 1987.  Some observers 
25. In the case of the lira-appearing in figure  3-the  January  1990  narrowing  of the 
band  (from  6.0 percent  to 2.25 percent  on both sides) was accomplished  together  with  an 
adjustment  of the central  parity:  the central  parity  was changed  so that  the upper  bound 
before  and  after  the realignment  remained  the same. 
26. See Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1989). Alberto Giovannini  231 
Figure 2.  The French Franc in the EMS, March 1979-December 1989a 
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Sources:  IMF, International Financial  Statistics,  and Masera (1987). 
a.  The franc-mark exchange  rate is shown,  along with the shaded bilateral fluctuation margins. 
Figure 3.  The Italian Lira in the EMS, March 1979-December  1989a 
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Figure 4.  Fluctuations in the Lira-Mark and Franc-Mark Exchange Rates, 
June 1973-December 1989a 
Percent  change 
per month 
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Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics. 
a.  Vertical lines mark changes in the exchange  rate regime: March 1979 marks the start of the EMS; January 1987 
marks the change in exchange  rate management announced  by France and Italy. 
b.  Ticks represent January of each year. 
claim that 1987 marks the beginning of a change in the EMS regime (the 
vertical line at January 1987 marks the beginning of this new regime).27 
Since that time, France and Italy have resolutely avoided exchange rate 
depreciations.  The change in attitude at the Banque de France and the 
Banca  d'Italia was  especially  noticeable  in  1989, when  both resisted 
pressure from the Bundesbank to devalue through the further tightening 
of domestic credit. 
Exchange  Rates  and Inflation 
Figure 5 reports consumer price index (CPI) inflation rates for France, 
Germany, and Italy since  1958. The figure shows  that inflation rates in 
27. See, in particular,  Giavazzi  and  Spaventa  (1990). Alberto Giovannini  233 
Figure 5.  Inflation in France, Italy, and Germany, January 1958-March  1989a 
Percent 
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Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics. 
a. Inflation  figures  are the annualized  percent  changes  in the monthly  consumer  price  index. 
b. Ticks  represent  January  of the year indicated. 
France, Germany,  and Italy began  to diverge  significantly  after  the first 
oil shock; these divergences  have not been completely eliminated.  The 
EMS was created right before the second oil shock, and significant 
reduction  in and convergence of inflation  rates are not observed until 
the second half of the 1980s. The most recent data indicate almost 
complete convergence of French and German inflation, while Italy 
maintains  a differential  of about 3.5 percent with its partners. The 
experience  of most other  EC countries  has  been similar  to that  of France 
and Italy-the  exceptions being Greece and Portugal,  whose inflation 
rates  exceeded 10  percent  in the past year. 
Whether  the EMS has significantly  helped  its members  fight  inflation 
is the subject  of some controversy.  The view I have taken elsewhere is 
that  the statistical  evidence supporting  the hypothesis  that  the EMS has 
made a difference is very weak.28  The stochastic process governing 
28.  Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989). 234  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
output and wage and price inflation  has shifted in France, Denmark, 
Germany,  Ireland,  and Italy. The relation  between output  and inflation 
has worsened in Germany  and has improved  in all other countries, as 
the "imported  credibility"  theory would predict. However, the shift is 
not statistically  significant,  though the small sample size may account 
for the lack of significance.  Furthermore,  a similar  shift is observed for 
the United Kingdom, whose currency was floating at the time. And 
finally,  the shift occurs after 1983  and not at the inception  of the EMS. 
In conclusion, the "credibility boost" of the EMS has been rather 
limited,  though  it should  not be wholly dismissed. 
The interaction  of exchange rate changes and inflation  is highlighted 
in table 2, which reports  the annual  rates of change in unit labor costs 
and  the annual  rates  of change  in the franc-mark  and  lira-mark  exchange 
rates. The table underscores  the differences  within  the EMS during  the 
1980s.  Until 1986,  large  exchange  rate depreciations  in France  and Italy 
accompanied  large divergences in the growth rates of unit labor costs 
relative  to Germany.  Notice that  in 1981  and 1982  the rate  of depreciation 
of the exchange rate in France exceeded the rate of change of relative 
labor  costs, while  in Italy  the opposite  was true.  This  difference  probably 
reflects  the well-known  decision by Italian  authorities  to enter  the EMS 
with  a "depreciated"  currency.  This step helped  them  disinflate  through 
appreciation  of the real exchange  rate. 
After 1987,  exchange  rates  have been stable. Yet, in the case of Italy, 
the growth rate of unit labor costs has continued to exceed that in 
Germany.  Table  3 reports  the  growth  of real  compensation  per  employee, 
measured in terms of the CPI. In the past three years, despite the 
persistence  of inflation  differentials,  real  wages have grown  significantly 
in Italy, whereas French wages have remained broadly in line with 
German  wages. Finally,  table  4, which  reports  the  growth  of productivity, 
shows that the three countries have performed  similarly;  adjusting  for 
productivity  growth does not significantly  change the pattern  of com- 
petitiveness  reflected  by the growth  rate  of relative  wages. 
The effects of inflation  differentials  on international  competitiveness 
are  summarized  in table  5. The table  reports  the levels of wages in France 
and Italy (relative  to Germany)  when adjusted  for productivity,  and the 
terms  of trade  of the two countries  (also relative  to Germany).  Relative 
wages are adjusted  by multiplying  the ratio of wage shares in GDP by 
the relative  GDP deflator.  Terms  of trade  are export  unit  values divided Alberto Giovannini  235 
Table 2.  Changes in Unit Labor Costs and in the Exchange Rate, France and Italy 
Relative to Germany, 1980-89 
Percent 
France and Germany  Italy and Germany 
Relative  Relative 
unit labor  Exchange  unit labor  Exchange 
Year  costsa  rateb  costsa  rateb 
1980  6.9  -0.7  12.3  2.3 
1981  8.0  10.6  16.9  12.0 
1982  8.3  11.0  13.4  8.3 
1983  8.3  8.3  14.9  5.7 
1984  5.2  -0.6  8.1  0.9 
1985  2.8  0.8  6.4  10.9 
1986  -  0.4  8.3  2.9  2.6 
1987  -  0.1  1.5  4.3  5.7 
1988  0.8  0.8  5.9  -  0.8 
1989c  1.5  0.2  5.9  2.0 
Source:  European Economy,  November  1989. 
a. The change  in relative  unit labor  costs is the difference  between  the growth  rate of unit labor  costs in each 
country  and  that  in Germany. 
b. The change  in the exchange  rate  is the annual  rate  of change  of the franc-mark  and  lira-mark  exchange  rates. 
c.  Figures  for 1989  are estimated  using  incomplete  data. 
Table 3.  Change in Real Compensation per Employee, Germany, France, and Italy, 
1979-89a 
Percent 
Year  Germany  France  Italy 
1979  1.8  2.0  2.4 
1980  1.0  1.8  1.9 
1981  -0.8  1.1  3.9 
1982  -  0.5  2.3  0.2 
1983  0.5  0.4  0.8 
1984  1.0  0.5  0.0 
1985  1.0  0.8  1.0 
1986  4.1  1.4  1.6 
1987  2.2  0.6  4.0 
1988  2.0  1.1  3.8 
1989b  0.0  0.5  2.7 
Source:  European Economy,  November  1989. 
a. The table  shows annual  growth  rates  deflated  by the consumer  price  index. 
b. Figures  for 1989  are estimated  using  incomplete  data. 
by import unit values. The table highlights the differences between 
France  and  Italy.  The  former  corrected  its own losses in  competitiveness 
with  the  devaluations  of 1983  and 1986,  while  the  latter's  adjusted  relative 
wages have increased  steadily  throughout  the past ten years, except for 236  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 4.  Productivity Growth, Germany, France, and Italy,  1982-89a 
Percent 
Year  Germany  France  Italy 
1982  1.1  2.4  -0.3 
1983  3.1  1.1  0.4 
1984  2.7  2.3  2.8 
1985  1.3  2.0  2.0 
1986  1.3  1.9  1.9 
1987  1.2  2.1  2.9 
1988  3.0  2.8  2.5 
1989b  2.3  1.8  2.6 
Source:  European Economy,  November  1989. 
a.  The table reports annual growth rates in productivity,  which  is defined as GDP in constant  market prices  per 
person employed. 
b.  Figures for 1989 are estimated  using incomplete  data. 
a small correction  in 1986. Relative terms of trade, which include the 
effects of fluctuations  of dollar  prices on the import  and export baskets 
of these countries,  broadly  reflect  the behavior  of relative  wages.29 
In summary,  the recent and drastic stabilization  of exchange rates 
has occurred  at a time when inflation  rates, in Italy especially, have not 
fallen to German  levels. As a result, the stabilization  has been accom- 
panied-in both France  and  Italy-by  losses in competitiveness  relative 
to Germany.  In the case of Italy, this loss in competitiveness  adds to a 
sustained  trend  of real  appreciations  that  has increased  adjusted  relative 
wages by as much  as 40 percent since 1980.  The repercussions  of these 
policies on external  accounts  are shown  in table  6, which  reports  current 
account  balances  and  international  capital  flows. The French  and  Italian 
losses in  competitiveness  of the past  three  years  are  reflected  in  widening 
current account deficits; they are, however, overfinanced  by capital 
inflows  in both countries.  The balance-of-payments  surpluses  of France 
and Italy in the past three years indicate that the stance of monetary 
(domestic credit)  policies in the two countries has been tighter  than in 
Germany.  Table  7 reports  data  on output  growth  and  unemployment  and 
shows that  since the mid-1980s  the three  countries  have had  surprisingly 
similar  performances.  Sustained  growth  and high unemployment  char- 
acterize the recent experiences of all three countries. The large move- 
29. In the case of Italy, the divergences  between  the terms  of trade  and  the aggregate 
relative  wages  suggest  divergent  behavior  of wages  in  the  tradable  and  nontradable  sectors. Alberto Giovannini  237 
Table 5.  Adjusted Relative Wages and Terms of Trade, France and Italy Relative 
to Germany, 1979-89 
Ratio 
France and Germany  Italy and Germany 
Terms  Terms 
Relative  of  Relative  of 
Year  wagesa  tradeb  wagesa  tradeb 
1979  98.6  103.0  90.5  97.4 
1980  104.8  100.0  97.8  100.0 
1981  108.7  101.3  106.1  98.9 
1982  105.1  100.3  108.5  101.3 
1983  102.8  100.2  117.4  103.4 
1984  105.3  100.9  122.2  104.2 
1985  109.3  103.0  123.6  104.1 
1986  104.1  102.0  121.3  105.6 
1987  99.7  98.4  121.4  104.3 
1988  99.9  98.8  126.9  104.5 
1989c  101.1  99.4  137.2  104.6 
Source:  European Economy,  November  1989. 
a.  Adjusted  relative  wages  are  the  ratio of  adjusted  wage  shares  (total  economy)  in  GDP,  multiplied  by  the 
(exchange  rate adjusted) ratio of GDP deflators, for France and Italy relative to Germany. 
b.  Terms of trade are the ratio of export  unit values  to import unit values,  indexed  with  1982 =  100, for France 
and Italy relative to Germany. 
c.  Figures for 1989 are estimated  using incomplete  data. 
ments in relative prices have had a small impact on output growth 
because of strong  domestic  demand  in Italy  and France. 
Exchange  Rates  and Interest Rates 
Relative interest rate levels are measured  by nominal interest rate 
differentials  adjusted  by changes in the nominal  exchange rate. Thus, 
both  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates  determine  the return  to investors. 
The realized difference in return, d, between a foreign and domestic 
investment  is given by 
(1)  d=R-(R*-Jr+) 
where R and R* represent  the nominal  domestic and foreign rates of 
interest  respectively, and 3 is the percent  change  in the price of foreign 
currency  in terms  of the domestic currency.30 
30.  This relation is an approximation. It is exact for continuously compounded rates. 238  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 6.  Balance of Payments, Germany, France, and Italy,  1983-89 
Billions of U.S.  dollars 
Germany  France  Italy 
Current  Capital  Current  Capital  Current  Capital 
Year  accounta  accountb  accolunta  accountb  accounta  accountb 
1983  5.41  -  1.24  -5.17  1.08  1.38  -5.53 
1984  9.75  -  7.63  -  0.88  0.57  -  2.50  1.58 
1985  17.00  -  22.64  -0.04  -  5.64  -  3.54  8.41 
1986  40.09  -  49.43  2.43  -  7.29  2.91  -  8.01 
1987  46.12  -73.34  -  4.45  2.82  --1.66  -  7.67 
1988  50.47  -31.08  -  3.55  11.23  -  5.45  10.47 
1989c  55.48  -58.43  -4.30  5.03  -  13.50  26.33 
Sources:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  and the Bank of Italy. 
a.  The current account balance excludes  exceptional  financing. 
b.  The capital account balance is calculated  as the total change in reserves  less  the current account  balance. 
c.  The  1989 Italian data refer to the period January-October;  data are from the Bank of Italy. 
Table 7.  Output Growth and Unemployment, Germany, France, and Italy,  1983-89a 
Percent 
Germany  France  Italy 
GDP  Unemploy-  GDP  Unemploy-  GDP  Unemploy- 
Year  growth  ment  growth  ment  growth  ment 
1983  1.5  6.9  0.7  8.2  1.1  9.0 
1984  2.8  7.1  1.3  9.9  3.2  9.5 
1985  2.0  7.3  1.7  10.3  2.9  9.4 
1986  2.3  6.5  2.1  10.4  2.9  10.6 
1987  1.9  6.4  2.2  10.5  3.1  10.1 
1988  3.7  6.4  3.4  10.2  3.9  10.6 
1989b  3.8  5.6  3.3  9.5  3.5  10.5 
Source:  European Economy,  November  1989. 
a.  The table reports annual growth rates of GDP and unemployment  as a percent of the civilian labor force. 
b.  Figures for 1989 are estimated  using incomplete  data. 
The expected rate-of-return  differential,  r, is given by 
(2)  r = R-(R*  +  e), 
where  3e  is the expected rate of depreciation  of the domestic currency 
relative to the foreign  currency.  The realized  return  differential  can be 
decomposed  thus, 
(3)  d  r + (Se 
That is, realized  rate-of-return  differentials  are the sum of two compo- 
nents: expected rate-of-return  differentials  and unexpected changes in Alberto Giovannini  239 
exchange  rates, or exchange  rate "surprises."  The surprises  are only in 
exchange  rates  because both the domestic and  foreign  interest  rates are 
fully known when the investment is made. In other words, nominal 
interest  rates are assumed to be free of default  risk. In what follows, I 
report evidence on d and provide estimates of the decomposition in 
equation 3. The decomposition is carried  out by computing  plausible 
estimates of  the expected rate-of-return  differentials. Estimates of 
exchange  rate surprises  are the residuals.3 
Realized  Rate-of-Return  Differentials 
Realized rate-of-return  differentials  are obtained by computing  the 
net profit  from two strategies  in the foreign  exchange market.  The first 
strategy,  taking  a long  position  in marks,  is to borrow  liras  or francs,  buy 
marks spot, lend marks, and then sell marks spot at maturity. The 
second',  taking  a short  position in marks,  is to borrow  marks,  buy liras 
or francs spot, lend liras or francs, then repay the mark  loan by selling 
the liras or francs spot at maturity. Profits for both strategies are 
computed  in dollars. 
Because Italy and France imposed controls on international  capital 
flows in the first half of the 1980s and thus effectively isolated the 
domestic  and  international  money  markets  in their  currencies,  I use data 
on the offshore (Euro) market  in French francs, deutsche marks, and 
Italian  liras. An added advantage  of these data is that offshore money 
market instruments  that are denominated  in different currencies are 
practically  identical  as far as reserve, insurance,  and tax provisions  are 
concerned. 
The calculation  of speculative profits takes explicit account of the 
transactions  costs. Specifically,  the profits  on a long position in marks 
are 
(4)  [(1 + R*tJ  S,  *A  -(1  +  R  T)  SB 
where  T  equals 12  or 1, depending  on whether  interest  rates  are monthly 
or annual  (the subscript  t is monthly), R* is the mark  interest rate in 
annual  terms, R is the interest rate on franc or lira deposits, S* is the 
31. For  an  analysis  of interest  rate  differentials  between  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Germany, 
see de Macedo  and  Torres  (1989). 240  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1990 
Figure 6.  Profitability of One-Month Investments: The Franc Relative to the Mark, 
January 1981-May  1990a 
Percent 
Losses  from shorting  the  franc 
20 
0  MT  I  TV  I  1  l  \_59v 
-20  t  l  Profits  ft  nr  shorting  f 
40 
-40 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Year 
Source:  Data Resources  Incorporated (DRI) data base. 
a.  The figure shows  the annual percent return on investment  strategies  of shorting the franc (borrowing francs to 
lend marks) and shorting the mark (borrowing marks to lend francs) for one-month deposits.  All returns are calculated 
in U.S.  dollars. 
dollar-mark  exchange  rate, while S is the price  of one lira  or one franc  in 
dollars.  The subscripts  B and  A denote  bid  and  asked  rates, respectively. 
The profits  on a short position in marks  are obtained  by interchanging 
the two terms  within  the brackets  in equation  4 and  substituting  bid  rates 
for asked rates  and  asked rates  for bid rates. 
Figures  6 and  7 show the profits  (computed  using  equation  4) over the 
period  January  1981-May  1990  on one-month  investments. The profits 
are  reported  from  both  a strategy  of borrowing  francs  or liras  and  lending 
marks  and a strategy  of borrowing  marks  and lending  francs  or liras. A 
solid line denotes the former;  a dotted  line denotes the latter.  When  it is 
profitable  to borrow  francs or liras and then lend marks,  the solid line 
falls below zero. Conversely, when the opposite strategy  is profitable, 
the dotted  line rises above zero.32  The distribution  of realized  returns  is 
very similar  for both currencies:  shorting  the franc  and the lira relative 
to the mark  has been profitable  less than  a quarter  of the time during  the 
past ten years, and almost  never since the beginning  of 1988.  However, 
when  profitable,  shorting  the franc  and  lira  has yielded  high  returns. 
32.  For both deposit  rates and exchange  rates, the source  is Reuters.  All series  are 
sampled at the London close. Alberto  Giovannini  241 
Figure 7.  Profitability of One-Month Investments: The Lira Relative to the Mark, 
January 1981-May 1990a 
Percent 
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Source:  DRI data base. 
a.  The figure shows  the annual percent return on investment  strategies of shorting the lira (borrowing liras to lend 
marks) and shorting the mark (borrowing marks to lend liras) for one-month  deposits.  All returns are calculated  in 
U.S.  dollars. 
By contrast, the figures show that shorting  the mark  in favor of the 
franc  or lira  has yielded  lower  but  much  more  consistent  returns.  Indeed, 
this strategy  has been profitable  65 percent  of the time in the case of the 
franc, and 75 percent in the case of the lira. Figure 8, which plots the 
distribution  of returns  from  shorting  the  mark  and  lending  liras,  illustrates 
this asymmetry.33  The distribution  of lira returns  is approximately  the 
same, with the highest frequency of small positive realizations,  and a 
very low frequency  of extremely negative or extremely positive reali- 
zations. 
The profitability  of  investments in one-year deposits-shown  in 
figures  9 and 10-has  followed a pattern  similar  to, though  more  marked 
than,  the one-month  investments.  Shorting  the franc  in favor  of the mark 
has been profitable  only 30 percent of the time, while the opposite 
strategy  was profitable  70 percent  of the time  .34 Contrary  to the evidence 
from  one-month  interest  rates, the size of speculative  returns  is similar 
33. The sample  distribution  of returns  for the franc  relative  to the mark  is extremely 
similar. 
34. I report  both statistics  because  there  could  well be several  instances  when, due to 
transactions  costs, neither  strategy  is profitable. 242  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Figure 8.  Distribution of Lira Returns on Shorting the Mark: January 1981-June  1990a 
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Source:  DRI data base. 
a.  The figure shows  the frequency  of realized  returns for a strategy of borrowing marks in order to lend liras in 
the one-month  Eurodeposits  market. 
for both strategies.  In the case of the lira, speculation  against  the mark 
has been profitable  86 out of the 102 months in the sample, while the 
opposite strategy has been profitable  only 13 out of 102 months. An 
investor  would have made  money consistently, every month  from  June 
1981  to June 1984  and from January  1987  to June 1990, had he simply 
borrowed marks to invest in liras. Strikingly,  the size of the "short- 
mark" positive profits is much larger than that of the "short-lira" 
positive profits. 
Interest Rate Differentials  and Exchange  Rate  Margins 
The analysis of bilateral  exchange rate margins  provides additional 
evidence relevant  to the decomposition  of realized  rate-of-return  differ- 
entials.35  In March  1979,  France  and Italy declared  that they would not 
allow  their  exchange  rates  with  the mark  to cross given margins,  without 
an official modification  of the margins. Given this intention, suppose 
that the required  rate-of-return  differential  between marks  and francs 
were zero. If the upper bound on the franc-mark  exchange rate were 
35. See Svensson  (1990)  for an application  of this analysis  to the Swedish  krona. Alberto Giovannini  243 
Figure 9.  Profitability of One-Year Investments: The Franc Relative to the Mark, 
January 1981-June 1989a 
Percent 
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Source:  DRI data base. 
a.  The figure shows  the annual percent  return of investment  strategies  of shorting the franc (borrowing francs in 
order to lend marks) and shorting the mark (borrowing marks to lend francs) for one-year  deposits.  All returns are 
calculated  in U.S.  dollars. 
Figure 10.  Profitability of One-Year Investments: The Lira Relative to the Mark, 
January 1981-June  1989a 
Percent 
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Source:  DRI  data  base. 
a. The  figure  shows  the annual  percent  return  of investment  strategies  of shorting  the lira  (borrowing  liras  in order 
to lend  marks)  and  shorting  the mark  (borrowing  marks  to lend  liras)  for  one-year  deposits.  All returns  are calculated 
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fully credible, the franc interest rate at time t could never exceed the 
following  value: 
(S)  R,=  [(I  + R  -  -1]  . 
For simplicity,  I consider only interest rates on one-year investments. 
In the equation,  S denotes the upper  bound  on the franc-mark  exchange 
rate, while St is the spot franc-mark  exchange rate at time t. Similarly, 
the franc  interest  rate  can never be lower than: 
(6)  R  H  ++R*)s  -  Ii 
where S is the lower bound  on the franc-mark  exchange  rate. 
R, and  R, are observable  at every time t. If the franc  interest  rate at t 
is outside these two bounds, either the margins  are not credible-that 
is, agents expect that, over the maturity of the interest rates considered, 
the exchange  rate  can cross the margins-or the required  rate-of-return 
differentials  are nonzero. 
Figures 11  and 12  compare  the actual  one-year  franc  and lira  interest 
rates  with the upper  and  lower "credibility"  bounds  implied  by the spot 
Figure 11.  Franc Interest Rate and its "Credibility Bounds,"  January 1981-June  1990a 
Percent 
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Sources:  DRI data  base and Masera  (1987). 
a.Te solid line depicts  the actual  one-year  franc  interest  rate.  The dashed  lines depict  the "credibility  bounds" 
implied  from  the spot exchange  rates,  the exchange  rate  margins,  and  the mark  interest  rates  (see equations  5 and  6). Alberto  Giovannini  245 
Figure 12.  Lira Interest Rate and Its "Credibility Bounds,"  January 1981-April  lg9oa 
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Sources: DRI  data  base and Masera  (1987). 
a. The solid line depicts the actual  one-year  lira interest  rate. The dashed  lines depict  the "credibility  bounds" 
implied  from the spot exchange  rates, the exchange  rate margins,  and the mark  interest  rates (see equations  5 
and  6). 
exchange  rates, the exchange  rate margins,  and the mark  interest  rates. 
Both the franc and lira interest rates are consistently above the upper 
bound,  which confirms  the evidence on the systematic  biases of realized 
returns  discussed  previously.  If risk  premiums  are second-order,  figures 
11  and 12  indicate  that  the perceived  probability  of realignments  is quite 
high, since the expected value of the exchange rate exceeds the upper 
bound.  The highest  values in the distribution  of exchange  rates  one year 
ahead  must significantly  exceed the upper  bound  in order  for the mean 
to be greater  than  the upper  bound.  Notice, however, that  the divergence 
between the actual interest rates and the upper  bounds has decreased 
over the last three  years. 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
To complete  the analysis  of interest  rates, I report  nominal  long-term 
rates  in table 8. These rates are long-term  government  bond  yields from 
the IMF's International Financial Statistics.  A number of problems with 
the data, however, preclude  the precise calculations  presented  above. 
First, the maturity  of these bonds is not reported  and may not be the 246  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1990 
Table 8.  Long-Term Government Bond Yields, Germany, France, and Italy,  1979gOa 
Percent 
Period  Germany  France  Italy 
1979-86  7.96  12.24  16.01 
1987-89  6.34  9.09  10.19 
January 1990  8.07  9.52  11.52 
June 1990  8.86  9.76  11.69 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics,  October  1990 and 1990 Yearbook. 
a.  The figures are the average bond yields  for the period shown. 
same in each country. Second, domestic government  bonds have not 
been as freely tradable  as Eurodeposits,  especially during  the first half 
of the 1980s. 
The decomposition  of return  differentials  on long-term  interest  rates 
follows: 
I+  R7LL  where L  +  Rfr =  (1 +  rL)  fL  (1  +  s,+)]  e  l 
where  L represents  the maturity  (in years) of the bonds, and  RL and  R*L 
are the domestic  and  foreign  rates of interest  for bonds of maturity  L; r  L 
is the risk premium,  and s^,  is the expected annual  rate of change in the 
exchange  rate  from year t to year t +  1. Equation  7 says that, net of the 
risk premium,  interest  rate differentials  represent  the average expected 
rate  of depreciation  of the exchange  rate  over the maturity  of the bonds. 
From  this perspective,  the large  differentials  among  nominal  bond  rates 
observed  in January  1990  suggest  rather  large  expectations  of exchange 
rate adjustment.  In order  to verify this guess, however, it is necessary 
to evaluate  the size of risk  premiums. 
Alternative Explanations for  Interest Rate Differentials 
Equation  3 breaks  down the realized  excess returns  of franc  and lira 
assets relative to mark  assets. The equation  says that realized rate-of- 
return  differentials  equal  the sum  of expected  rate-of-return  differentials 
and exchange  rate surprises.  To determine  whether  the long sequences 
of large return  differentials  could be a long sequence of exchange rate 
surprises,  I discuss the determinants  of the first  term  on the right-hand 
side of equation  3 and  its plausible  size. An attempt  to quantify  expected Alberto Giovannini  247 
rates of return should consider three possible sets of determinants: 
transactions  costs, capital-market  segmentations  (capital  controls),  and 
the pricing  of risk  with perfect  and  imperfect  capital  markets. 
TRANSACTIONS  COSTS.  In the presence of transactions  costs and 
uncertainty  about  returns  on foreign  currency  deposits, traders'  strate- 
gies can be characterized  by an "inactivity" band, the size of which is 
determined  by the magnitude  of the transactions  costs in the foreign 
exchange  markets  and the uncertainty  in expected rates of return.36  An 
increase  in the expected return  on lira  deposits, for instance,  may not be 
accompanied  by a shift in portfolios  if traders  believe that the costs of 
adjusting  the portfolios  and  closing  out their  position  in the  future  exceed 
the expected  return  on the lira  investment.  Uncertainty  and  transactions 
costs therefore  induce traders  not to eliminate  expected rate-of-return 
differentials  unless they reach sufficiently  high values, or are expected 
to persist. 
What  does this  observation  imply  for  equilibrium  returns?  If  all  market 
participants  behave according  to the same trading  rules, it is possible 
that, even in the absence of risk aversion, expected rate-of-return 
differentials  will be positively autocorrelated.37  With  rational  expecta- 
tions, realized rate-of-return  differentials  would also be positively au- 
tocorrelated.  Autocorrelation  of returns,  however, does not imply the 
biases  that  seem  to characterize  excess returns  on lira  and  franc  deposits. 
Therefore,  the effects of transactions  costs are not likely to explain  the 
evidence reported  in figures  6 through  10. 
CAPITAL  CONTROLS.  The segmentation  of national  capital  markets 
prevents  efficient  portfolio  diversification  and  induces  expected rate-of 
return  differentials  on assets located in different  countries. France and 
Italy used controls, at least until 1986, that prevented full arbitrage 
between domestic and foreign capital markets. These controls have 
typically generated  large differentials  between domestic and offshore 
interest  rates  on the same types of interbank  deposits. 
The evidence in figures  6 to 10 is constructed  using interest  rates on 
Eurodeposits,  that is, rates on deposits denominated  in francs, marks, 
and  liras  but  located outside the three  countries.  In principle,  Eurorates 
36. Baldwin  (1990). 
37. Absence  of risk  aversion  implies  a world  where  expected  rate-of-return  differentials 
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should  simply  reflect  the market's  assessment of risk  and  exchange  rate 
changes. 
Yet capital controls may also affect offshore interest rates through 
two channels:  first, the difficulty  in transferring  funds from onshore to 
offshore may give rise to liquidity  premiums  due to the thinness of the 
offshore market;  second, all transfers  of funds in the Euromarkets  are 
cleared in the countries of the currencies  being traded-high political 
risk may be reflected in an unwillingness  to trade and in additional 
liquidity  premiums.  Neither argument  seems to apply  to the currencies 
considered.  Funds  do not  need  to be transferred  from  onshore  to offshore 
for agents to take advantage of the profit opportunities  documented 
above. It is sufficient  to purchase  liras  or francs  in the foreign  exchange 
market,  and  then  lend  them  in the Eurodeposit  market.  As far  as political 
risk is concerned, restrictions  that  prevent  the clearing  of funds related 
to offshore transactions  would be extremely severe and are unlikely  to 
be imposed in countries like France and Italy, even after all types of 
transfers  of funds  between domestic  residents  and  foreigners  have been 
prohibited. 
Finally, the evidence discussed previously indicates that realized 
return  differentials  have persisted  well after  the liberalization  of capital 
controls  in 1986.  Since that time, the wedge between onshore rates and 
offshore rates has disappeared. In some instances domestic interest 
rates  have been higher  than  offshore  rates.38 
EQUILIBRIUM  PRICING  OF  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  RISK.  The  next 
potential explanation of  expected rate-of-return  differentials is  the 
equilibrium  pricing  of foreign  exchange risk. To assess the importance 
of foreign-exchange  risk premiums,  one must rely on some version of 
the capital  asset pricing  model (CAPM).  However, empirical  evidence 
has  repeatedly  rejected  various  specifications  of the  international  CAPM, 
precisely because the risk premiums  generated by these models are 
significantly  smaller  and  less volatile than  empirical  risk premiums.39 
The potential  sources of the CAPM's  empirical  failure  are two. First, 
statistical  tests may have rejected the CAPM  because of specification 
error.  In particular,  it may be that  agents  are  not all alike, either  because 
38. See Giavazzi  and  Spaventa  (1990).  These  phenomena  reflected  liquidity  problems, 
onshore  rather  than  offshore,  and  restrictions  on capital  inflows. 
39. The empirical  literature  on the CAPM  is vast. For  a critical  survey  of international 
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they have different  attitudes toward risk, or because they cannot use 
financial  markets  to diversify away certain  types of risk. In both cases 
the "representative  agent" paradigm  does not apply. As the following 
discussion  will  point  out, the computation  of risk  premiums  can, to some 
extent, allow  for these problems.  Second, if the pattern  of returns  in the 
foreign exchange markets is such that large adjustments  occur infre- 
quently,  standard  tests of the CAPM  that  do not account  for this peculiar 
distribution  of returns  are flawed:  this is the "peso" problem.40  In the 
presence of a peso problem, even if expectations are rational, the 
probability  that sample  averages  match  agents' expectations  is very low 
in small samples, despite the fact that sample averages are unbiased 
estimates  of population  averages. 
Consider  the standard  representative-agent  CAPM. From the inves- 
tor's optimization  problem, the model yields equilibrium  relations  be- 
tween conditional expectations and conditional covariances of asset 
returns. As a general framework, I adopt the version of the CAPM 
derived  by Philippe  Weil  and  myself.41  When  rates  of return  on the assets 
in the portfolio  and consumption  growth  are  jointly lognormally  distrib- 
uted,42  the equilibrium  relations  between expected returns  on deposits 
denominated  in francs (J),  liras  (1),  and  marks  (m)  are: 
(8)  In [E(Rm)  =  _p  (y,c  -  UM,c)  +  (UfM  - 
U(M,M), 
(9)  ln [E((R)  =  P1  p  7 (  -  cTc)  +  y  p 
((i'M 
-  Um,M). 
LE(kn  I  pI  -  ip 
When  deposits in currency  i have a gross return,  adjusted  for changes  in 
the exchange rate, of Ri, the term on the left-hand  side is the log of the 
ratio of expected gross returns  measured  in dollars. The reciprocal  of 
the coefficient  of intertemporal  substitution  is p, and  -y  is the coefficient 
of relative  risk  aversion.  The variable  vi,M  is the covariance  of the log of 
the gross rate of return  on asset i with the log of the gross return  on the 
market  portfolio,  while ui,C  is the covariance  of the log of the gross rate 
40. See Krasker  (1980). 
41. Giovannini  and  Weil  (1990). 
42. This  assumption  can only hold  approximately.  Giovannini  and  Jorion  (1989)  argue 
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of return  on asset iwith the log of the  gross  rate  of growth  of consumption. 
The equations  are defined  for p #  1.43 
These equations include traditional  asset pricing models as special 
cases. For  example,  under  logarithmic  risk  preferences  (,y  = 1)  equations 
8 and  9 collapse to the so-called "static" asset pricing  equations,  where 
only the covariance  of an asset with  the market  rate  of return  determines 
its expected return  in equilibrium,  while in the case where  risk aversion 
equals intertemporal  substitution  (,y =  p, the case of Von-Neumann 
preferences) the two equations reduce to the "consumption-based" 
capital  asset pricing  model. 
To obtain  some rough  estimates  of the size of risk  premiums  from  the 
CAPM,  I estimate  average  covariances  of franc, lira, and mark  returns 
on one-year Eurodeposits  over the 1980s (using nonoverlapping  data) 
with market  and  consumption  indexes. In Giovannini  and Weil's paper, 
all first and second moments are conditional  on information  available 
every  period.  Here  the calibration,  instead,  uses average  data.  The  error- 
in-variables  problem  is negligible  if the covariance between the time- 
varying  first  and second moments  is second-order.44 
Calibration  of the model requires a choice between the relevant 
consumption  and market  indexes. Under the representative-agent  as- 
sumption, the market  index should be an average of national market 
indexes, and the consumption  index an average of national  consump- 
tions. The indexes I chose are Capital  International  Perspective's  world 
market  index and  consumption  growth  of OECD  countries.45  There  are, 
however, reasons to believe that the representative-agent  assumption 
does not hold, because individual  countries' attitudes  toward  risk may 
not be the same. First, consumption is not highly correlated across 
countries,  and second, as Michael  Adler  and Bernard  Dumas  point out, 
43. When  p =  1 Giovannini  and  Weil  (1990)  show that  covariances  with  consumption 
growth  and  the market  rate  of return  are  identical.  Hence both  the market  CAPM  and  the 
consumption  CAPM  are  true,  but  equations  8 and  9 are not defined. 
44. From the beta-representation  of expected returns, note that the conditional 
expected return  on an asset is equal to the product  of the conditional  beta times the 
conditional  expected return  on the benchmark  portfolio.  If the time-covariance  of the 
conditional  betas  and  the  conditional  expectations  of the  return  on the  benchmark  portfolio 
is negligible,  the expectation  of that product  is approximately  equal to the product  of 
expectations. 
45. The  world  market  index  comes  from  Morgan  Guaranty;  in  it, national  stock  markets 
are aggregated  using their relative  capitalizations  as weights. The consumption  growth 
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deviations  from  purchasing  power  parity  and  the  law  of one price  indicate 
that  the conditions  for aggregation  of national  indexes are not met.46 
Unfortunately,  aggregate  asset pricing  equations  for general  models 
that  allow heterogeneous  investors  are not available.  For this reason, it 
may be helpful to explore whether the predictions of rate-of-return 
differentials  differ  significantly  from  one national  investor  to another  in 
order to evaluate the empirical significance of  specification errors. 
Hence, I compute equilibrium  relative returns  from the viewpoint  of a 
U.K. investor  (that  is, I use the U.K. stock market  index and  the rate  of 
growth  of U.K. consumption)  and a Japanese  investor (using  the same 
measures  for Japan).47 
Table 9 reports the results of this exercise. The top section of the 
table contains the average relative returns  (the terms on the left-hand 
side of equations 8 and 9 expressed in percent) as measured  from the 
data,  together  with  the relevant  average  covariances,  also from  the data. 
The bottom section contains  the implied  relative  expected returns  from 
the model under  a small  set of parameter  combinations-the case of the 
static CAPM (,y =  1), the case of the consumption  CAPM (,y =  p =  2 
and 10,  respectively),  and  a general  case that  combines  high  risk  aversion 
(,y  = 10)  with the coefficient  of intertemporal  substitution  equal  to 0.5 (p 
=  2). The three  units in the columns  are, respectively, dollars,  pounds, 
and  yen.48 
Except for the case of the Japanese  investor, the table indicates  that 
the average  risk premiums  consistent with asset pricing  models tend to 
be smaller  than those observed in the data. The models often predict 
higher  expected returns  on mark  assets than on franc or lira assets. In 
the case of the Japanese investor, the static CAPM produces risk 
premiums  that resemble  the observed data, but a change in parameters 
generates very large differences between the data and the model's 
predictions. 
I now turn  to the second  reason  why asset pricing  models  are  rejected: 
peso problems.  The  potential  of large  and  rare  devaluations  might  explain 
46. Adler  and  Dumas  (1983). 
47. Columbia  Center  for International  Business Cycle Research  provided  the stock 
market  indexes. Consumption  growth  comes from  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators. 
48. While  relative  real  returns  are  in principle  more  appropriate  than  nominal  returns, 
in practice  inflation  uncertainty  is so small  relative  to exchange  rate uncertainty  that  the 
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Table  9. Calibration  of Risk Premiums,  for Investors  in Selected  Currencies,  1981489a 
World  investor  U.K. investor  Japanese investor 
(U.S. dollar)  (pound)  (yen) 
Sample data 
Average  rate-of-return  differentials 
Franc  1.44  1.05  1.05 
Lira  4.30  4.14  4.14 
Covariance  with market 
Mark  0.0200  0.0173  - 0.0061 
Franc  0.0192  0.0212  0.0322 
Lira  0.0220  0.0211  0.0321 
Covariance  with consumption 
Mark  0.0005  0.0003  -0.0009 
Franc  -0.0000  -0.0000  0.0010 
Lira  0.0013  0.0000  0.0011 
Theoretical  risk  premiums 
Static CAPM (-y =  1) 
Franc  -0.09  0.39  3.84 
Lira  0.20  0.39  3.83 
Consumption  CAPM (-y =  p =  2) 
Franc  -0.12  -0.06  0.38 
Lira  0.15  -0.03  0.15 
Consumption  CAPM (-y =  p =  10) 
Franc  -,0.61  - 0.30  1.87 
Lira  0.74  -0.15  2.02 
General CAPM (-y =  10, p =  2) 
Franc  -0.41  -0.62  - 27.29 
Lira  -0.23  - 3.40  - 27.00 
Source:  Author's own calculations  using equations 8 and 9 from text.  The world market index comes  from Morgan 
Guaranty; in it, national stock markets are aggregated using their relative capitalizations  as weights. The consumption 
growth measure comes  from the OECD's  Main Economic  Indicators. 
a.  The table reports results for investments  in French francs,  Italian liras, and deutsche  marks. 
the evidence from  table 9. The table suggests that  risk  premiums  do not 
seem to account for the average rate-of-return  differentials  between 
marks,  francs,  and  liras.  Yet this  evidence is not necessarily  inconsistent 
with rational expectations. It could indicate that investors had been 
expecting exchange rate changes that never occurred, but that, given 
policymakers'  objectives and constraints  and the distribution  of exoge- 
nous shocks to Germany,  France, and  Italy, changes  are not to be ruled 
out. The presence  of a "peso problem"  should  not significantly  bias risk 
premiums  because it should  not affect covariances  with the market  and Alberto Giovannini  253 
consumption. The occurrence of  large exchange rate changes can 
significantly  change  the covariances  in equations  8-9 if those exchange 
rate changes are associated with large changes in either consumption, 
market  return,  or both. This is unlikely to occur if the world portfolio 
and  the representative  investor's consumption,  both on which the asset 
pricing equation is based, are well diversified. Errors can, however, 
occur  in small  samples  if the large  realizations  of exchange  rate  changes 
are  either  overrepresented  or underrepresented  in the sample.  Since my 
interpretation  of the evidence is that, if anything,  these large  exchange 
rate changes  are underrepresented  in the sample  used for my computa- 
tions, and since population  covariances should be unaffected  by their 
potential  occurrence, my computations  should be little affected by the 
peso problem. 
Hence, the  results  reported  in  table  9 lead  me  to conclude  that  standard 
asset pricing  models do not seem to consistently  explain  average  excess 
returns  on lira  and  franc  deposits relative  to deposits in marks.  Theoret- 
ical  risk  premiums  appear  to be small,  or, more  seriously,  of the opposite 
sign  than  the observed  average  rate-of-return  differentials. 
RISK  PREMIUMS  WITH  NONMARKETABLE  RISK.  Onereasonwhy  the 
CAPM  fails empirically  might  be, as pointed  out above, the presence of 
risk that cannot be efficiently diversified away in financial markets. 
While in the previous section I argued that, in the presence of well- 
diversified  international  portfolios, the rare and large depreciations  of 
the lira  and the franc  relative  to the mark  should  not significantly  affect 
covariances  with the market  and consumption  as computed  in table 9, 
this may not occur in the presence of nonmarketable  risk. 
To illustrate  this possibility,  consider  the optimization  problem  of an 
individual  investor  maximizing  expected  utility.  The  efficiency  condition 
is that (at every time and conditional  on the information  available)  the 
expectation  of the product  of the gross return  on asset i and  the marginal 
rate  of substitution  in consumption  must  equal  unity: 
(10)  E[IRq]j  =  1, 
where  -q  is the ratio  of the marginal  utility  of consumption  at the time of 
the payoff of asset i to the current marginal  utility of consumption. 
Following  Weil, consider a two-period  setup, where at the start  of the 
first  period  all agents  are identical  in their  endowments  and risk  charac- 254  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
teristics.49  Their  total income is the sum of a marketable  and a nonmar- 
ketable  component.  The nonmarketable  component  is distributed  iden- 
tically across investors.50  Given the definition  of the risk-free  rate of 
return,  RF  =  1/E(q),  and the relation  E[qRIj  =  E(6)E(Ri) +  Cov(6, R1), 
we obtain 
( 11)  E(Rk)  =  RF (  -  Cov(q, R)) 
for any i, and  thus: 
E(RI)  1 -  Cov(q, R) 
(12)  E(Rj)  1 -  Cov(q, RJ) 
The expression  within  the parentheses  in equation 11  is greater  than 1, 
since Cov(q, R]) is negative:  an increase  in the rate  of return  on an asset 
in the portfolio  increases future  consumption,  and therefore  decreases 
its marginal  utility.  Equations  11  and 12  are  formally  identical  to standard 
asset pricing equations, like those from which equations 8 and 9 are 
derived.  The important  difference  is the presence  of nonmarketable  risk 
in the marginal  rate of substitution,  -q.  Because of the presence of this 
risk, risk  premiums  can diverge  from  those in the standard  asset pricing 
model if returns  on different  assets have different  covariances  with the 
marginal  rate  of substitution. 
From  the  analysis  above, it can  be shown  that  the size of the theoretical 
risk-free  rate and the empirical  rate-of-return  differentials  is such that 
the covariance  between the marginal  rate of substitution  and the rate  of 
return  on francs  and  liras  should  be about  twice the size of the covariance 
computed  assuming  perfect  risk pooling. However, it is difficult  to find 
convincing  reasons why large exchange rate changes should affect the 
covariances  of franc  and lira  assets more than that of mark  assets. The 
most plausible forms of nonmarketable  risk in international  financial 
markets  are those relating  to the problems  of asymmetric  information, 
and those arising  from legal constraints  on financial  intermediaries.5' 
Large exchange rate changes produce potentially large transfers of 
49. See Weil (1990).  If returns  and nonmarketable  risk were i.i.d., this model would 
be applicable  to a multiperiod  setup. 
50. When  all investors  are  alike,  they all hold  the same  portfolio  of tradable  securities, 
which  in equilibrium  equals  the market  portfolio. 
51. For  problems  relating  to asymmetric  information,  see Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983). Alberto  Giovannini  255 
wealth among  financial  intermediaries  in the Euromarkets  and can give 
rise to liquidity  problems  and  bankruptcies.  However, the mechanics  of 
these liquidity  crises do not depend  on the specific  currency  composition 
of bank  portfolios. For these reasons, the covariance  of returns  on lira 
and franc assets with the marginal  utility of consumption  (or with any 
other benchmark)  should not be significantly  affected by large  changes 
in the franc-mark  or lira-mark  exchange rates. Therefore, the kind of 
nonmarketable  risks that characterize  international  financial  markets 
should not affect expected rates of return  on deposits denominated  in 
different  currencies. 
Real Wages and Real Interest Rates 
The evidence presented  in the previous section can be summarized 
as follows. The past three years have been characterized  by increased 
stability  of exchange  rates within  the EMS: both volatility  and  trends  in 
the franc-mark  and  lira-mark  exchange  rates  have decreased  noticeably. 
The  decrease  in inflation  differentials  among  Germany,  France,  and  Italy 
has been achieved, especially in the case of Italy, with a substantial 
increase in real wages and an improvement  in the terms of trade. The 
past three years have witnessed some worsening of the competitive 
position of both France and Italy. Persistent interest differentials  be- 
tween  franc,  lira,  and  mark  assets are  difficult  to explain  by risk  premiums 
and capital-market  imperfections.  And finally,  the mirror  image  of high 
realized  real  interest  rates and  high  real  wages has been current  account 
deficits and capital account surpluses (often more than offsetting the 
current  account deficits)  in Italy and France. In Germany,  by contrast, 
there have been large current account surpluses matched by capital 
account  deficits. 
What  underlies  the persistence of real-wage  and real-interest  differ- 
entials at low levels of inflation  well after  the dramatic  reduction  of the 
inflation  disparities  of the mid-1980s?52  This section reviews alternative 
explanations. 
52. The  problem  of high  real  interest  rates  in the EMS,  and  its relation  to the credibility 
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"Pure"  Wage and Price  Stickiness 
The first natural  candidate is the traditional  wage-price stickiness 
story.53  According  to this theory, high  real wages and a loss in competi- 
tiveness result from the transition  to credible exchange rate targeting 
because only a fraction  of existing  prices and  wages in the economy are 
reset every period. 
The first problem  with this explanation  is that the new regime has 
been in place for some time now; the transition  is presumably  over. 
Some claim that France and Italy dramatically  altered their domestic 
policies in response  to the discipline  of the EMS  in the mid-1980s;  others 
regard  January  1987  as the date when these two countries pledged to 
forgo parity changes. The persistence of real-wage and real-interest 
differentials  three years after the presumed  change  in regime  is hard  to 
square  with the standard  models  of overlapping  wage contracts.  In those 
models, inertia  lasts only for the maximum  length of wage contracts.54 
What  would then be needed is some type of protracted  price stickiness 
of the type discussed, for example,  by Olivier  Blanchard.55 
Even if protracted  nominal  sluggishness  is present, however, these 
models still cannot explain  the persistence  of interest  rate differentials. 
If the exchange rate is credibly fixed, the increase in money demand 
coming from the fall in inflationary  expectations due to the change in 
regime  would  automatically  be accommodated  by balance-of-payments 
surpluses.  The nominal  interest  rate  need not go up.56  In order  to explain 
the  observed  interest  rate  differential,  one should  rely  on slow adjustment 
in international  asset markets,  or risk premiums,  a hypothesis that was 
ruled  out earlier. 
In the end, there are a number  of reasons to believe that nominal 
53. Analyses of inflation  stabilization  with exchange  rate targeting  are carried  out in 
Cukierman  (1988)  and  Fischer(1988).  Wage  and  price  dynamics  underalternative  exchange 
regimes  are  discussed  in Dornbusch  (1982)  and  Alogoskoufis  (1990). 
54. In addition,  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  in Europe  nominal  wage  stickiness  is 
significantly  less important  than in the United States: see, for example, Sachs (1979), 
Branson  and  Rotemberg  (1980),  and  Grubb,  Jackman,  and  Layard  (1982, 1983). 
55. Blanchard  (1983). 
56. Of course the real interest  rate in terms  of domestic  goods would increase. This 
would occur because the differential  between own-good  interest  rates is approximately 
equal  to the expected change  in the relative  price  of the two goods. But the relative  price 
of the domestic  good is expected  to fall as the transition  period  draws  to a close. Alberto Giovannini  257 
stickiness may not exclusively explain the observed behavior of real 
interest rates and real wages in France and Italy relative to Germany. 
This  is not  to say that  nominal  inertia  is irrelevant,  but  only that  additional 
explanations  may be useful. 
Credibility Problems 
The next possible hypothesis is that the policy change  lacked credi- 
bility. In order  to illustrate  that hypothesis, it is useful to follow Robert 
Barro  and David Gordon's standard  model of interaction  between the 
government  and  the private  sector.57 
The model incorporates several assumptions. First, unanticipated 
changes  in nominal  exchange  rates have real  effects. Second, monetary 
authorities  perceive a cost in exchange rate changes, which under a 
managed  floating  regime can represent  the cost of the induced higher 
inflation.  In a regime like the EMS, the cost could represent,  together 
with the cost of higher inflation, the political cost of exchange rate 
changes. Third, there are distortions in the economy that could be 
corrected, even if temporarily,  by exchange rate changes. The best 
example  for European  countries  is the monopoly power of some trade 
unions. Fourth,  monetary  authorities  can respond  to events faster than 
the aggregate private sector. And fifth, the state of the economy is 
represented  by the realization  of an exogenous disturbance  that affects 
the real  economy. In other  words, slow multiperiod  adjustment  of prices 
or wages is ruled  out for the sake of tractability. 
The unanticipated  exchange rate changes and the exogenous distur- 
bance affect the economy as follows: 
( 13)  ~~~~y  =  (s^ -  Se)-  (13)  s  s  E 
where  E is a white noise real disturbance,  and  y is the departure  of real 
income  from  trend. 
The  preference  of monetary  authorities  is represented  by the  following 
loss function: 
(14)  L  =  E[A2  +  4(y  -  K)2], 
where the first  term  represents  the costs of exchange  rate changes, and 
57. Barro  and Gordon  (1983a, 1983b).  In this section, I closely follow the excellent 
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the second term, with K >  0, represents the distortions that may be 
corrected  by exchange  rate changes. 
The ability of monetary  authorities  to respond  to events faster than 
the aggregate  economy is captured in the assumption that monetary 
authorities set the rate at which the exchange rate is changed after 
observing  E, while the private sector forms expectations on monetary 
policy before  the realization  of E.  Under  these assumptions,  a regime  of 
managed  floating  would be one where s is the solution  of the following 
problem: 
(15)  Min[S  2 +  (y 
-  2] 
subject  to 
y  =  (s  -s^e)-  E, with  ge given. 
The change in the exchange rate, the equilibrium  activity, and the 
expectations  of exchange  rate  changes  are, respectively: 
(16)  s=  K+1K  + 
(17)  Y=  1+ 
(18)  S=  4K 
These familiar  results highlight  the inflationary  bias in a regime  where 
the central  bank is unable  to commit credibly  to a fixed exchange rate 
target. 
Learning  about the Change  in Regime 
Consider now the case where national monetary authorities-for 
reasons that are not explicit in the model (like the desire to accelerate 
European  integration)-abandon any attempt  to correct domestic dis- 
tortions with the exchange rate, and stick to the fixed exchange rate 
parity:  s is equal  to zero independent  of the state. 
The private  sector, not fully aware  of or convinced by this change  in 
regime, believes that the authorities  could revert to the discretionary 
management  of the exchange  rate  described  above. The public  assigns a 
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exchange rate rule. Every period, this probability  is revised optimally 
based on the observed behavior of the monetary authorites. That is, 
p,+  is decreased  if s, = 0. The expectation  of the exchange  rate change 
is thus: 
(19)  S=  pse, 
where 5e,d  is the expectation of the depreciation  of the exchange rate 
when the authorities  follow discretionary  exchange rate management. 
Assuming  rational  expectations,  ged  is formed using the knowledge  of 
the authorities'  incentives, which are embodied  in the first-order  condi- 
tion for the constrained  minimization  in equation  15. Thus, 
(20)  E[Se  +  4({ 
-  p^e,d  -  E  -  K)]  0 
This implies: 
Ae,d  1  1 
1  -  ?(  _ p)  K 
1 -4,(1  jK) 
If the authorities  adhere  to the exchange rate parity,  p is progressively 
decreased  until  it reaches  zero. The transition,  however,  is characterized 
by a series of prediction errors. This generates data resembling the 
phenomena  described  above. 
Consider  interest  rate  differentials.  Equation  3 indicates  that  realized 
interest rate differentials  could be high, even if expected real-interest 
differentials  were zero. Negative exchange rate surprises  also depress 
economic  activity: 
y  =  -  e-  E  -  -__K__E. 
1  -(1  -jp) 
The  intuition  behind  this result  can be provided  by the evidence on real- 
wage differentials. Wages are set with an expectation of a positive 
exchange rate depreciation. If the exchange rate depreciation  is not 
realized, the loss in competitiveness is reflected in a fall in economic 
activity. 
The model of slow adjustment  of expectations  raises two questions. 
The first regards  the speed of adjustment  of expectations. The model 
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cally converge  to zero. This convergence  has not occurred  in countries 
like France and, especially, Italy. More strikingly, this convergence 
does not seem to occur in countries  with an experience of much more 
stable  exchange  rates. 
The case of Austria  provides an interesting  example. Until the early 
1970s  the schilling  and  the mark  were tied  together  by the Bretton  Woods 
system: both currencies were pegged to the dollar (hence the March 
1961 revaluation of the mark was reflected in a devaluation of the 
schilling).  With  the collapse of the Bretton  Woods regime, the schilling 
was pegged to a basket of currencies, in which the mark gained an 
increasing  weight. Finally, in 1981 the schilling was tied to the mark 
exclusively. The only sizable  change  in the schilling-mark  exchange  rate 
occurred at the end of  1969, when the price of the mark increased 
progressively  from  about  6.5 to around  7.0 (a  depreciation  of 7.5 percent). 
In contrast  to the franc and the lira, the schilling  has kept remarkably 
stable  relative  to the mark  throughout  the 1980s. 
In the years  after  1986,  the period  for  which  reliable  data  are  available, 
Austrian  short-term  interest  rates  exceeded German  short-term  rates  by 
an average  of about  50 basis points. The experience  of the Netherlands, 
a member  of the EMS that has kept its currency  and monetary  policy 
tightly  linked  to Germany's,  broadly  matches  the evidence for Austria. 
Transactions  costs and  liquidity  premiums  are  important  in  explaining 
these small  interest  rate differentials;  for this reason, it is more difficult 
to identify expectations of exchange rate changes. Yet, this evidence 
raises the possibility that governments'  commitment  to a given parity 
may be less than fully credible, even in the long run. After all, the fact 
that different  currencies  are maintained  reflects  the governments'  right 
to change their currencies' value. Given that exchange rate changes 
have real effects, governments  may be reluctant  to give up this instru- 
ment. 
Exchange  Rate  Changes  as  "Escape  Clauses" 
An alternative  to the "learning"  model presented  above is a model 
where the public  is aware that there will always be instances when the 
monetary  authorities  will want to use the exchange  rate.58 
58. This model has been recently developed by Flood and Isard (1989). Also see 
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Here the government's  strategy  is a mixture  of fixing the exchange 
rate (s  =  0) and discretionary  policy. For this reason, the model is 
labeled "escape clause." Discretionary  policy is chosen whenever the 
exogenous shock  E exceeds a given range.  The public  fully understands 
this and  bases its own expectations  about  the government's  behavior  on 
the probability  of large  realizations  of E,  the instances when the escape 
clause will be invoked. Given that E  is  serially independent, these 
probabilities  are constant. 
The solution  of this model is formally  identical  to that of the learning 
model, except that  now  p is constant  and  represents  the probability  that 
E lies beyond the "normal"  range. Hence, as long as E remains  in the 
normal  range  there  will be high  realized  real interest  rates and high  real 
wages. When  the large  realizations  of E occur, the government's  discre- 
tionary  exchange  rate  changes  will be more  effective, because the public 
will be more surprised  than under a managed  exchange rate regime. 
Thus, it can be easily shown that there are parameter  values such that 
this strategy would be preferred by the government to both fixed 
exchange rates and managed floating.59  The mixed strategy is thus 
credible.60 
Extensions  and Implications 
An important  difference  between these models and reality  is that the 
state of the economy is not serially independent.  Because of the slug- 
gishness of prices and wages, and the slow response of employment  to 
real wages, the loss in competitiveness gradually  builds up. In other 
words, for a given stream  of realizations  of the exogenous disturbance, 
the incentives to change  the exchange rate increase, since the losses in 
competitiveness due to past increases in prices remain. In the model 
discussed  above, the losses in competitiveness  do not linger;  rather  they 
result  in an immediate  fall in economic activity. 
An extension  of the model  to deal  formally  with  these issues is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  My guess is that the escape clause equilibrium, 
if it is at all viable, may be subject to more frequent exchange rate 
59. See Flood  and  Isard  (1989);  Persson  and  Tabellini  (1990). 
60. Another  virtue  of the "escape  clause"  model  is that  it could  be sustained  in  a multi- 
period  setting, where this game resembles  the one studied  by Rotemberg  and Saloner 
(1986). 262  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
realignments  and larger  biases of realized real interest rates when the 
realignments  do not occur. An additional,  more manageable  extension 
of the model  mixes  the learning  and  the escape clause  parables.  Elements 
of both stories seem relevant  to the European  experience:  the public  is 
not sure how serious the commitment  is to monetary  convergence and 
might  revise its views as years go by; yet, there is always a belief that 
governments  may use the exchange  rate under  extreme  circumstances. 
Even the probability  that  the government  might  resort  to exchange  rate 
changes  may be subject  to revision. 
An interesting  feature of the above analysis extends the theory of 
optimum  currency  areas.  A regime  of fixed  exchange  rates  with separate 
currencies is not equivalent to a single currency, because the public 
understands  that the monetary  authorities  may use exchange rates to 
correct  distortions.  This awareness  leads to biases on rates of return  to 
productive  factors, for which the welfare  effects are estimable. 
A calculation  of the welfare effects of the interest rate distortions 
should take uncertainty  into account, and in particular  the fact that in 
the escape clause model large realizations of the exogenous shock 
occasionally occur. Two types of effects should be relevant in this 
calculation.  First, the long-run  rate of return  might  be tied down, either 
by a modified  golden-rule  condition, or, in the case of a small open 
economy,  by the  world  rate  of interest.  In  this  case, the  wedges discussed 
here may have large  welfare  effects, similar  to those arising  from  taxing 
savings.  And second, when uncertainty  is accounted  for, a more  precise 
estimate  of the investment  distortion  is possible. 
Transition to Monetary Union 
This section examines the current  policy debate in the light of the 
evidence  presented  above and  its possible  interpretations.  What  follows, 
however, is  necessarily an attempt to take only a snapshot of the 
diplomatic  exchanges  that  have accelerated  in the very recent  past. The 
speedup may be due to the December 1990  intergovernmental  confer- 
ence, which will seek changes in the Treaty of Rome allowing  for the 
creation  of a common  European  central  bank. 
In this section, I discuss the feasibility-and indeed  the desirability- 
of gradualism  as a strategy  to achieve a monetary  union. Next I turn  to 
the perceived problems hindering  further progress of the monetary 
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speed" EMU, with a core group of countries moving toward a single 
currency  before  the rest  of the EC. Finally,  I describe  the likely  positions 
of the major  negotiators  at the intergovernmental  conference. 
Can Gradualism Work? 
I have presented  evidence that exchange  rate targets  in the EMS are 
still not fully credible.  This lack of credibility  is the curse of gradualism. 
I have  also shown  that,  if the incentives  to change  exchange  rates  remain 
intact,  expectations  of change  will persist. The question  then  is whether 
the Delors plan has significantly  affected the incentives for France  and 
Italy to devalue their currencies  relative to the mark.  These incentives 
combine the real effects of surprise  realignments  and the political and 
economic costs of these realignments. 
Some observers believe that the political costs of devaluations, as 
perceived by French and Italian  authorities,  are higher  now than they 
were five years ago. This might  well reflect  these two countries'  greater 
political  enthusiasm  for an integrated  European  economy with a single 
currency. The resistance of other EC partners, as well as problems 
raised  by external  economic shocks, may, however, lower  the perceived 
political  costs of exchange  rate  changes.  The intrinsic  dynamics  of wages 
and prices can also lower the perceived costs of devaluation,  because 
exchange  rate  misalignments  build  up in the absence  of full convergence 
of inflation  rates. Finally,  the present  institutional  setting  furtherjustifies 
the lack of credibility  of exchange  rate  targets.  Nothing  prevents  mone- 
tary  authorities  from  using  changes  in bilateral  parities  to accommodate 
price imbalances. Indeed, the Delors report views this strategy as 
acceptable-even  desirable  (at least according  to the interpretation  of 
this plan by German authorities)-in  the transition, since it allows 
exchange  rate realignments  during  stage one, and possibly even during 
stage two. 
The model discussed previously implies that, when exchange rate 
targets  are not fully credible,  convergence  can never  be complete.61  For 
61. The model shows that nominal  interest  rates will never converge. In the model, 
the rate  of inflation  does not appear,  but it is reasonable  to assume  that  price  inflation  is 
equal  to P, whereas  wage inflation  is equal  to Se.  Therefore  price  inflation  converges,  but 
wage  inflation  does not:  the result  is a fall in economic  activity.  The  general  lesson is that, 
in the absence of exchange  rate adjustments,  inflation  rate differentials  may persist  for 
prolonged  periods  before  the disruptions  brought  to the external  balance  and  employment 
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this reason, it is unlikely that monetary  authorities  would be able to 
maintain  exchange  rate  targets  throughout  the whole adjustment  period. 
Thus,  gradualism  fails.  The  elimination  of small  inflation  rate  differentials 
seems a faulty criterion  to guide a monetary  reform.  The stubbornness 
of small  inflation  differentials  prevents  monetary  authorities  from  decid- 
ing  when maximum  inflation  convergence  is reached. 
These observations are based on the implicit assumption  that real 
shocks  are  absent.  Under  this  assumption,  and  absent  the  nonneutralities 
arising  from  credibility  problems  under  fixed  exchange  rates, all relative 
prices between the low- and the high-inflation  countries  would be equal 
to unity. Indeed, this implicit  assumption  provides the benchmark  for 
the inflation-convergence  criterion.  In reality,  however, real shocks are 
present, and therefore  the criterion  of inflation  convergence becomes 
even less reliable, because it requires the knowledge of equilibrium 
relative  prices. The difficulties  in computing  equilibrium  relative  prices 
arise from the well-known uncertainties  about the relevant economic 
model  and  its parameters,  discussed, for example,  by Jeffrey  Frankel.62 
In conclusion, economic theory suggests that gradualism  is not an 
effective strategy  for monetary  reform.  The recent increase  in the price 
of oil will almost  surely  bring  the weakness of gradualism  into the open. 
First, the increase in the price of oil is a real shock, and EC countries 
may believe it is necessary to allow intra-European  real exchange  rates 
to change. This implies giving up the twin objectives of exchange rate 
stability  and inflation  rate convergence. In addition,  the increase in the 
price  of oil will  affect  inflation  and  inflationary  expectations.  Calculations 
that  I performed  with  Francesco  Giavazzi  using 1980  input-output  tables 
show that the aggregate  effect of a 10 percent increase in the price of 
energy  products  ranges  from 1.3 percent  in France  to 1.9 percent  in the 
Netherlands  when constant nominal  wages are assumed and all other 
prices are allowed to adjust. The effect ranges  from 6.6 percent in the 
Netherlands  to 7.2 percent  in Germany  and the United Kingdom  when 
constant  real wages are assumed  for all the countries.63  These numbers 
take  into  account  the  effects of intra-European  input-output  interactions. 
They indicate  that the structure  of production  in EC countries  does not 
necessarily  disadvantage  the "high-inflation"  countries. However, the 
62. Frankel  (1988). 
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large  differences  between  constant  nominal  wage  and  constant  real  wage 
simulations suggest that, despite the technological homogeneity of 
European economies, an energy shock can have large destabilizing 
effects if it affects price-setters'  expectations  unevenly.  4 
The pitfalls  of the gradualist  approach  lend support  to the alternative 
"monetarist"  strategy.  The monetarist  strategy  calls for a sudden  and 
permanent  change  in the monetary  regime.  Elsewhere  I have  argued  that 
the best way to achieve a monetary  union, once the common  monetary 
authority  is in place, is through  currency  reform.65  Currency  reform  is a 
replacement  of national  currencies  either  by a single  currency  or by new 
national  currencies  that exchange  at parity  (one mark  equals  one franc, 
equals one lira, and so on).66  This reform  is carried  out over a specified 
period  of time, during  which residents of each country  swap old bank- 
notes for new banknotes at a prespecified rate. Bank accounts are 
automatically  converted. As a result, the stock of money in circulation 
is unaffected.  During  the same period,  all outstanding  assets and liabili- 
ties in the economy have to be recalculated, requiring  considerable 
expense: all accounting  and  control  systems-both  private  and  public- 
have to be translated. 
While  the two alternatives  (one-to-one  exchange  rates  versus a single 
currency)  produce  the same effect on prices (aligning  nominal  prices of 
all goods in the EC), they are not exactly equivalent  for two reasons. On 
one hand, some countries might  be unwilling  to give up their national 
currency's  name  and symbol  in exchange  for a single  currency,  perhaps 
the ECU. These countries  may  find  it more  desirable  to change  the units 
in which their  national  currencies  are denominated.  On the other hand, 
the persistence of banknotes with the old names and symbols might 
make the currency of those countries with previously high inflation 
somewhat  less desirable,  especially  in retail  transactions.  A compromise 
solution  would be to print  new banknotes  with the ECU name together 
with  the names  of all the currencies  in the monetary  union. 
The advantages  of currency  reform  are many. First, the abolition  of 
exchange rates eliminates  the distortions  arising  from expectations of 
64. These  calculations  do not account  for  the impact  of the oil price  increase  on wealth 
and  aggregate  demand. 
65. Giovannini  (1990). 
66. Triffin  (1960)  advocated  a reform  that locked intra-European  exchange rates at 
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exchange rate changes. Second, a currency reform solves  unit-of- 
account problems, by cutting down on the calculations necessary to 
translate  prices in different  currencies-with N currencies,  the number 
of relevant  bilateral  exchange  rates is (N2/2) -  (N/2).67  Third,  it allows 
final adjustments  of exchange rates without inducing  any changes in 
inflationary  expectations. Finally, and most importantly,  it is the only 
reform  that is fully credible, since it does not allow reversals  to the old 
regime. 
However,  a currency  reform  is a  politically  costly undertaking  because 
it requires  the  full  and  immediate  commitment  of all  countries  that  decide 
to join; it forces the setup of a common  European  central  bank  and the 
settlement  of issues related  to the bank's management,  accountability, 
and  tasks.68 
Obstacles  to a Currency Reform 
The sensible strategy  for monetary  union is a currency  reform.  This 
proposal, however, faces two important  obstacles. The first is the 
creation  of a common  central  bank  that  is independent  of national  fiscal 
authorities  and can carry  out its own objectives  without  undue  pressure 
or influence from national governments. The second obstacle is the 
question  of participation  in the monetary  union. 
One source of pressure on a European  central bank that has been 
frequently  debated  in the past year is the divergent  fiscal stances of the 
individual  countries.  Table 10  shows debt-GNP  ratios  for EC countries. 
The table highlights  the nature  of the divergences. Differences in debt- 
GNP ratios  induce  large  differences  in interest  spending,  and even with 
similar  primary  balances, differences  in net borrowing.  Thus, high-debt 
governments  are forced to turn to financial  markets  both to roll over 
large  stocks of debt and, typically,  to finance  larger  current  deficits. 
The data in table 10 raise two questions. Can a monetary union 
function  without  a central  fiscal  authority?  What  threats  do independent 
fiscal authorities  present to the successful functioning  of a European 
central  bank? 
67. The advantages  of a single currency  are discussed in detail by Ernst & Young 
(1990)  and  Gros  and  Thygesen  (1990). 
68. For a discussion of the problems  of ensuring  the independence  of a European 
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Table  10. Debt-GNP  Ratios,  EC Countries,  1989 
Ratio 
Country  Debt-GNP ratio 
Belgium  127 
France  35 
Germany  43 
Italy  99 
Netherlands  78 
United Kingdom  44 
EC12  58 
Source:  Estimates  from  Bishop  (1990,  p. 2). 
The  first  question  is raised  by those who regard  central  banks  as fiscal 
agencies of the government, charged  with managing  the government 
debt, either  by selling  securities  to the market  or by purchasing  govern- 
ment securities  directly  in exchange  for high-powered  money. Over  the 
years, central  banking  has progressively  moved away from these func- 
tions, for which the private  banking  sector is perfectly  equipped.  Now 
central  banks are concerned about the soundness of financial  interme- 
diaries, the stability of interest rates and the exchange rate, and the 
control  of inflation.69  Another  concern  about  fiscal  authority  regards  the 
optimum-currency-area  trade-off  between monetary and fiscal policy 
stressed,  for  example,  by Peter  Kenen.70  The  creation  of a single  currency 
area  might  allow a centralized  fiscal authority  to redistribute  income in 
response to region-specific shocks.71  The current policy sentiment, 
especially in the EC countries, is that a centralized and permanent 
system of income transfers  may be plagued  by inefficiencies.  Financial 
intermediaries  and development banks, perhaps under the explicit 
direction  of national  governments,  are probably  better  suited  for identi- 
fying the relevant development opportunities,  for selecting the most 
socially  efficient  projects,  and  for monitoring  their  progress. 
The second question  raised  by the current  structure  of fiscal  authority 
and its divergent imbalances regards the spillover of national fiscal 
69. See Goodhart  (1988)  for  a historical  and  comparative  perspective  on the evolution 
of central  banking.  Goodhart  stresses the role of central banks as public insurers  of 
systemic  risk,  and  traces  it back  to the  birth  of the Bank  of England.  Barro  (1989)  discusses 
the  concerns  of central  banks  with  interest  rate  stability. 
70. Kenen  (1969). 
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shocks into the whole Community,  and the effect these spillovers  have 
on the operations  of a common  central  bank.72  Three  types of spillovers 
are relevant  in this case. The first  is the traditional  Keynesian  spillover, 
associated  with the export of crowding  out in a region  characterized  by 
integrated  financial  markets  and a single currency.  The bias in this case 
is expansionary,  and the effects are an increase in the real interest  rate 
and  an appreciation  of the region's  real  exchange  rate  relative  to the rest 
of the world. Hence, the pressure  on a central  bank  would be to offset 
these biases through  monetary  expansion.73  The second  type of spillover 
comes from  distortionary  taxation  in the presence  of increased  mobility 
of goods and  factors  within  the area. Uncoordinated  tax policies lead to 
tax competition  and undertaxation  of the mobile factors with adverse 
effects on national  budgets.  If national  governments  are unable  either  to 
decrease spending  or to increase  taxation  of the immobile  factors  by the 
required amounts, tax competition increases the net borrowing of 
national governments and may force the common central bank to 
monetize  part  of the deficits. In addition,  higher  government  borrowing 
increases the stock of government  debt. The third  type of spillover is 
related  to the dynamics  of debt and deficits and to the systemic effects 
of funding crises of individual  governments. In countries with large 
stocks of debt, questions are raised about the ability of the national 
government  to adhere to its intertemporal  budget constraints  without 
debt repudiation  or other forms of extraordinary  taxation. The impact 
of these crises on financial  markets  may be quite significant,  especially 
if the absolute size of the government  debt is large.  The common  central 
bank  may  be led to inject  liquidity  into  financial  markets  in  order  to avoid 
the  negative  effects of a systemic  crisis  associated  with  multiple  collapses 
of financial  intermediaries. 
Spillovers of the first kind are not quantifiable,  since the relevant 
transmission  is the one from national saving  rates to the real exchange 
rate and the real interest rate. As Laurence Kotlikoff convincingly 
argues,  it is not possible to establish  a reliable  link  between government 
72. See Cohen  and  Wyplosz(1989)  and  Buiterand  Kletzer(forthcoming)fordiscussions 
of externalities  associated  with  noncooperative  fiscal  policies. 
73. Alternatively,  some central  bankers  would find  it more appropriate  to offset the 
aggregate  spending  biases  by monetary  contraction,  which  would  further  increase  interest 
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savings,  as measured  by the government  budget,  and  national  savings.74 
Spillovers of  the second kind deserve more careful consideration, 
although  to date  there  are  no reliable  numbers  on the impact  of the single 
market  on tax revenue (assuming  no change in national  tax structures 
and policies). At the same time, the Community  has practically  aban- 
doned attempts to comprehensively  overhaul tax coordination.  Con- 
cerns about  the ability  of countries  like Italy to stabilize  their  debt-GDP 
ratios  makes  spillovers  of the third  kind  the most significant  and  the most 
urgent. 
The  attitudes  of official  institutions  toward  the  coordination  of national 
fiscal authorities  with the common central bank mix concerns about 
stability  in  the  transition-that is, the  presence  of incentives  to depreciate 
currencies  during  the transition-and concerns about the operation  of 
the monetary  union. The Delors report  considers  convergence  of fiscal 
deficits  a crucial  condition  for monetary  union  and  advocates  concerted 
budgetary  actions  during  stage  one including  the development  of "quan- 
titative  guidelines  and  medium-term  orientations."  In the second stage, 
the report  calls for "precise, although  not yet binding"  rules that  relate 
to the size of budget deficits and their financing. In the third stage, 
budgetary  rules  would  become binding.  The EC document  on economic 
and monetary  union advocates the adoption  of "binding  procedures," 
whereby member  states submit  rules or guidelines  for their budgetary 
laws during  the transition,  the adequacy  of which would  be discussed at 
the Community  level.75  In the final stage, the Community  proposes 
monitoring,  adjusting,  and  enforcing  through  peer pressure.  Finally,  the 
EC Monetary  Committee  spells out even in greater  detail "principles  of 
sound budgetary  policies," which include the elimination  of govern- 
ments'  access to direct  financing  by central  banks,  no cross-government 
"bail  out" rules, and  the correction  of excessive deficits,  together  with, 
if possible, incorporation  of criteria  to determine  acceptable levels of 
budget  deficits  into the Treaty  of Rome.76 
It is not clear which specific externalities  would be corrected  by the 
74. Kotlikoff(1988,  1990).  A regression  of national  saving  rates  over  the 1980-84  period 
in the EC countries  over government  saving  rates yields a coefficient  of 0.18 (standard 
error  0.31). The coefficient  for the period  1985-89  is 0.17 (standard  error  0.27). 
75. European  Commission  (1990). 
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proposed  rules,  especially  the  rules  relating  to ceilings  on national  budget 
deficits.  These rules have been criticized  on the grounds  that  budgetary 
ceilings may eliminate  the flexibility  that national  governments  need to 
offset regional  shocks in the monetary  union  (given  the loss of monetary 
control).77  In the case of the United  States, budget  rules  such as Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings  have led to a proliferation  of artificial  accounting 
devices with little substantial  deficit  reduction  achieved. Furthermore, 
it is difficult  to develop credible sanctions against  countries  that break 
the rules. More  importantly,  none of the proposed  rules  directly  attacks 
the most serious  threat  to the stability  of a fledgling  European  monetary 
union: the occurrence  of debt crises. In principle,  a more satisfactory 
solution  to the problem  of ensuring  the minimization  of the risks of debt 
crises, while at the same time avoiding a slowdown of the monetary 
union,  would  have  been  the  definition  of fiscal  preconditions  for  countries 
to join the union. These preconditions  could include requirements  to 
stabilize convincingly-or  at least reduce-the  debt-GDP  ratio before 
joining the union. These preconditions  are politically  costly, however, 
both for the countries "in trouble" and for the "virtuous" countries, 
which tend to resist accelerations in the progress toward monetary 
union.  The former  would  have to engineer  large  fiscal  stabilizations  fast, 
without  the option of delaying  adjustment  or the hope of exporting  the 
political  costs of the adjustment  to the rest of Europe. The latter  would 
have  to proceed  immediately  to the next step  of the union,  either  together 
with  the countries  that  have completed  the  fiscal  stabilization,  or  without 
them. 
These observations highlight  the second important  obstacle to the 
currency  reform-the  question of participation  in the monetary  union, 
or the "two-speed" EMU. The Delors report does not impose the 
constraint  of full participation  on all stages of the monetary  union, yet 
the importance  of this reform is such that several governments  have 
expressed uneasiness with informal  proposals of having  the monetary 
union begin with a small number  of EC countries that would increase 
progressively.  These proposals  have  been  prompted  by the observations 
of the sizable inflation  differentials  between Germany  and, say, Greece 
and  Portugal,  or the apparent  difficulties  that Spain  and  Italy are having 
keeping  their  inflation  rates  low without  losing  external  competitiveness. 
77. See especially  Buiter  and  Kletzer  (1990). Alberto Giovannini  271 
The debate on a "two-speed" EMU has been similar  to the debate on 
fiscal policy problems.  In both cases the concern was that the "weak" 
countries  would  impart  an inflationary  bias on the union's central  bank. 
If the cause of higher inflation  is fiscal policy, the discussion above 
applies.  By contrast,  if the source  of high  inflation  is simply  the monetary 
authorities'  lack of credibility,  it is unclear  that  a monetary  union  would 
seriously damage  the "hard core" countries, except when the public 
perceives that the reputation  of the new European central bank is a 
weighted average  of the reputation  of the central  banks of its member 
countries. Concern  by the low-inflation  countries  about these risks, as 
well as resistance  by the high-inflation  countries  to any project  aimed  at 
speeding up the monetary union for only a subset of the European 
Community,  are additional  reasons to delay the monetary  reform.78 
December  1990 Intergovernmental  Conference 
On October  8, the U.K. government  decided that the pound should 
join the EMS.79  Despite a long  series of official  statements  that  the pound 
would  join the EMS only when the U.K. rate  of inflation  converged  with 
that  of Germany  (the  current  differential  is about  6 percent),  this  decision 
has not surprised  those who expected the United Kingdom  to ensure 
itself a crucial  role at the intergovernmental  conference. The entry of 
the United Kingdom  into the active negotiations  on EMU will crucially 
determine  their outcome. The British  position on EMU could become 
the swing factor in the collective decisions, since that country is the 
natural  ally of neither  the "monetarists"  nor the "economists." 
The two extremes of the political spectrum  toward  EMU are repre- 
sented by Germany-the "economist -and  France  and Italy together 
with Belgium-the  "monetarists." The latter countries favor steady 
progress  of monetary  union  and, with the possible exception of France, 
would not oppose the idea of a currency reform. They support the 
concept of an independent  central  bank  modeled  after  the Bundesbank 
78. The outright  opposition  to the idea  of a "two speed" monetary  union  by the high- 
inflation  countries  (see, for example,  "Spain  Counts  Cost of Joining  the Club,"  Financial 
Times,  June 20, 1990)  stems from the perception  that the reputation  cost of being left 
behind  is very high,  and  its political  effects might  be equally  serious. 
79. The fluctuation  bands  chosen by the U.K. government  are  6 percent  on both  sides 
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and the Federal Reserve  System. They acknowledge  the important role 
of the EMS in their own disinflation experience. 
On the other end of the spectrum, Germany is the champion of the 
"economist"  view  on monetary union.80 It strongly resists  initiatives 
that might accelerate the process.  It fully believes  that, with the appro- 
priate adjustment, inflation and inflationary expectations  can fully con- 
verge. It regards the convergence of inflationary expectations an absolute 
precondition for embarking on the next stages of the monetary union. 
It is very difficult to determine where the United  Kingdom fits into 
this picture.  Britain has consistently  opposed  all recent  initiatives  to 
increase  economic  integration in Europe,  including the completion  of 
the single market, the EMU, and the intergovernmental conference.  The 
U.K.  rationale is well explained by the following interpretation of Prime 
Minister Thatcher's thought: 
...  But part  of this function  [of the Conservative  Party]  is "external  vigilance 
as a condition of our liberty," and, as she [Thatcher]  has also trenchantly 
indicated-the  Government  has not laboured arduously since 1979 to eject 
socialism  in the UK only to find  it entering  through  the back-door  via Brussels; 
thus any intention  that the European  Commission's  writ should extend to the 
minutiae  of economic  and social policies must  be firmly  rejected.81 
The position  of the U.K.  government  is a blend of a vigorous  anti- 
regulation and antisocialist  sentiment with a strong desire to preserve 
national sovereignty and national identity.82 
The special position of the U.K.  government makes its contributions 
to the discussion on EMU somewhat orthogonal to the rest of the debate. 
The U.K.  Treasury presented two related proposals in 1989 and 1990. 
The first called for an "evolutionary"  approach to monetary union that 
would exploit to the maximum the virtues of competition.83 According 
to this proposal, the best way to manage the transition to monetary union 
is to remove  all obstacles  that prevent private agents from effectively 
diversifying their currency portfolios. The effects of deregulation would 
be to increase  the pressures  on "deviating"  monetary authorities and 
force convergence  to the "best"  regime,  characterized  by stable pur- 
80. For an excellent exposition  of the position  of German  monetary  authorities,  see 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1990). 
81. Minford  (1989). 
82. Spaventa  (1990)  and Wolf (1989)  provide  two useful discussions of the political 
aspects  of the debate  on EMU. 
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chasing  power  and  an  efficient  payments  system.  The  Treasury  document 
suggested  that  the move to a single currency  could happen  as a result  of 
"natural  evolution"  resembling  the law of the survival  of the fittest. 
More  recently,  the U.K. government  has circulated  a follow-up  to the 
1989  document  stressing  the need  to give independent  status  to the ECU. 
For this reason, the latest proposal is sometimes labeled the "hard 
ECU" proposal.  This proposal  is aimed  at ensuring  that, if the markets 
decide to adopt  a single currency,  it will be the ECU.84 
Thus, on the issue of the relevant  horizon  for EMU, it is difficult  to 
see the United Kingdom  becoming  an ally of Italy, France,  and  Belgium 
given its opposition  to government-directed  monetary  reform.  It is also 
difficult  to see the United Kingdom  as an ally of Germany  since that 
would  imply  an  acceptance  of the  EMS  status  quo,  which  is characterized 
by a distribution  of monetary  sovereignty  biased in favor of Germany's 
monetary  authorities.  In sum, the divergent  positions of the EC govern- 
ments at the start of the intergovernmental  conference do not provide 
clear signals  about its outcome. While  there is always the possibility  of 
a diplomatic  breakthrough,  it seems that the conference is not likely to 
provide much additional impetus to  a  monetary union among EC 
countries. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper  has discussed the problem  of monetary  reform  in Europe. 
The current  initiative  of EC countries  to move toward  a single  currency 
is similar  to the Werner  plan, discussed  and  approved  in 1970.  That  plan 
was quickly  discarded  in the face of an exogenous shock: international 
capital  flows toward  the mark  in anticipation  of a collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. Twenty  years later, a second plan  for monetary  union  is 
84. HM Treasury  (1990). While it is not the purpose  of this section to analyze the 
theoretical  underpinnings  of the different  countries'  views, it might  be useful  to point  out 
that  the  circulation  of the ECU in  parallel  to national  currencies-even with  all  the  features 
that are proposed  to ensure  the stability  of its purchasing  power-does  not necessarily 
induce  its adoption  as the single  European  currency.  This  question  hinges  on the existence 
of multiple equilibria  in an economy of competing currencies. The "thick market" 
externalities  associated with the use of a widely circulating  medium  of exchange can 
generate  many  self-sustaining  equilibria,  and  it is not clear  what  it takes  to move from  one 
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challenged  by another  exogenous shock: the increase  in the price of oil 
caused by the invasion  of Kuwait  and the tension in the Gulf area. The 
results  of my  analysis  suggest  that  the  gradualist  strategy  lacks  credibility 
and  thus may be hard  to maintain. 
Partly  because of the oil shock, the European  currency  reform  has 
now reached a deadlock. The strategy  currently  pursued, gradualism, 
can mask  a lack  of commitment  by national  governments  and  is therefore 
less  than fully credible. The alternative strategy, currency reform, 
requires the solution of difficult political problems that include the 
creation  of a multinational  central  bank  and the substitution  of national 
currency  with a new money  at unfamiliar  exchange  rates. In the absence 
of strong political leadership, currency reform is unlikely in the near 
future. The current  halfway house, characterized  by complete capital 
mobility,  tight  exchange  rate targets,  and lack of institutional  coordina- 
tion of national  monetary  authorities,  could easily collapse. 
The recurrence  of similar  difficulties  twenty years after  the failure  of 
the Werner  plan highlights  the basic problem  faced by European  coun- 
tries with respect to currency reform: they understand  and seek the 
benefits of a single currency, but sudden reform poses considerable 
political  difficulties  and  large  adjustment  costs. As a result, they tend to 
adopt  gradualist  strategies  that  are likely to be self-defeating. Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard  N. Cooper: Alberto  Giovannini  has really  written  two papers: 
a long and interesting interpretive  paper on continuing interest rate 
differentials  in Europe,  and  a relatively  brief  paper  on the prospects  and 
problems  of European  monetary  unification.  I will first  make  a relatively 
brief  remark  on the longer  part  of the paper  and then a longer  remark  on 
the shorter  part  of the paper. 
In the more developed part  of the paper, Giovannini  rejects several 
hypotheses about the persistent differences in interest rates between 
France  and  Italy, on the one hand,  and  Germany,  on the other. Instead, 
he favors the hypothesis that these differentials  result from exchange 
risk-the  "escape clause" embodied  in the possibility  of future  changes 
in central  exchange  rates. 
I suspect that he is right. It is worthwhile, however, to examine 
several  possible  sources  of the  difference,  only some  of which  Giovannini 
discusses. I have four in mind:  credit  risk, liquidity  risk, exchange  risk, 
and tax differences. Giovannini  discusses exchange risk at length. His 
reason  for excluding  credit  risk and differences  in tax treatment  may be 
that he draws mainly on the Eurocurrency  interest rates, a market  in 
which  the participants  are  presumably  subject  to the same  tax treatment. 
The same major  banks  are assumed  to engage in Euro-lira,  Euro-franc, 
and Euro-mark  transactions.  While that is probably  true, some verifi- 
cation  would be useful because substantial  differentials  have opened up 
the market perceptions of the credit risk associated with particular 
banks, even the biggest banks. For example, if a few banks dominate 
the Euro-lira  market,  there may be an element of credit  risk. Similarly, 
countries  follow different  practices regarding  taxation of overseas in- 
come. One could use some assurance that these differences are not 
affecting  Euromarket  interest  rates in different  currencies. 
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Giovannini  has likely underrated  the influence  of market  liquidity  on 
interest  rates. U.S. Treasury  bills command  a premium  because of the 
tremendous  liquidity  of that market.  Thus, Euro-marks  have probably 
enjoyed some liquidity  premium  compared  with Euro-francs  and Euro- 
liras. 
Incidentally,  that possibility  suggests a test. I suspect that the Euro- 
franc mnarket  was relatively thin during the period of Giovannini's 
estimations.  In periods  of crisis, substantial  short-run  differentials  have 
opened  up  between  the Paris  and  London  markets  in  francs,  a differential 
that can only be explained  by the short-run  effectiveness of exchange 
controls.  However, France's  residual  exchange  controls  were  eliminated 
in 1990.  With  that  move, the Euro-franc  market  has presumably  become 
more  liquid.  If the liquidity  hypothesis  has some merit,  one should  see a 
narrowing  of the interest  rate  differentials  from  mid-1990. 
It is sometimes  useful, in the context of the current  European  debate, 
to look at the experience of the United States. This country has, after 
all, 50 sovereign  and relatively  independent  jurisdictions,  all subject  to 
a common  market  environment. 
To measure  exchange  risk,  one might  ask  what  the typical  differentials 
on short-run  notes of U.S. states have been in the absence of exchange 
risk but in the presence of credit risks and liquidity  effects. A series of 
pairwise  comparisons  suggests  that  interest  differentials  across states- 
at any given time, for notes of comparable  credit risk and maturity,  all 
one year or less-are  normally  in the range  of 10  to 35 basis points, but 
with  occasional  observations  running  up  to a maximum  of 95  basis  points, 
in the absence of exchange  risk. 
That information  suggests that Giovannini  may not be correct in his 
interpretation  of the  Austrian  schilling-deutsche  mark  differential,  which 
typically is 50 basis points. This may reflect  a liquidity  premium  on the 
mark, as against the schilling, rather  than an escape-clause exchange 
risk on the Austrian  schilling. 
U.S. experience, however, cannot  explain  the differentials  of several 
hundred  basis points between the franc and the lira, on one hand, and 
the mark, on the other. Giovannini  is probably  correct in interpreting 
those as predominantly  exchange  risk. 
Let me turn now to the larger questions of European monetary 
unification.  Giovannini  simply assumes that monetary  unification  will 
go forward;  or, rather, he reports that everyone else assumes it. He Alberto  Giovannini  277 
raises the question  whether it will proceed slowly or rapidly, with the 
strong  suggestion  that rapid  is better. Indeed, slow may undermine  the 
process. 
If so, then why has movement  been so slow? An answer  is especially 
pertinent since in my view the technical conditions for a common 
currency-meaning a reasonably  efficient  international  capital  market- 
have existed since the time of the Werner  plan  in the early 1970s. 
Three obstacles have impeded more rapid progress. The first is a 
psychological  one, the question  of sovereignty. People are reluctant  to 
give it up. It is a reluctance  based on a misunderstanding  because no 
sovereignty  is given  up. But, as European  Vice President  Christofferson 
noted  in late 1989  after  the Bundesbank  raised  its discount  rate, the other 
central  banks  of Europe  had about  45 minutes  of sovereignty,  by which 
he really  meant  freedom  of action. It is an exercise of sovereignty,  not a 
derogation  of sovereignty, to execute agreements  with other sovereign 
nations., 
A much  more  important  obstacle to currency  unification  in Europe  is 
that  the debate  over a common  currency  has become a surrogate  for the 
debate  over a united  Europe.  For the last 40 years an influential  minority 
of Europeans has aspired to create a United States of Europe. That 
debate  was very active in the 1950s,  became quiescent  during  the 1970s, 
and  has come back again  in the late 1980s  as an explicit, open part  of the 
agenda. 
The creation of the Common  Market  with its common agricultural 
policy was seen as the first  step, at least after  the failure  of the European 
defense community,  in the early 1950s.  The next logical step is seen to 
be the creation of a common currency, followed, in view of the rapid 
changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe, by new attempts  to 
create  a common  European  defense. 
There  is major  disagreement  over whether  a United States of Europe 
is  a desirable objective. Unhappily, much opposition to  European 
currency  unification  is generated  by those who are opposed to a United 
States of Europe. They see a currency  union as the next step of those 
who favor such a federation  and they react  by blocking  further  entrance 
of the camel into the tent. 
These are, however, entirely  separable  issues. It is quite possible to 
have a common  currency  without  having  a United States of Europe. A 
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common monetary policy. The Federal Reserve System provides an 
interesting  model, allowing  for suitable  changes  to ensure  the continuing 
existence of sovereign  nation  states. 
We have had several examples: the Latin Monetary Union in the 
nineteenth century, the Belgium-Luxembourg  union today, and two 
current  African  currency  unions containing  seven and eight sovereign 
states respectively;  each union  has a common  currency.  Thus, it is quite 
possible to separate  these two issues. It would be useful to focus on the 
debate over a European currency union and not let those issues get 
confused with the issue of whether there should be a United States of 
Europe. 
The technical debate surrounding  common currencies hinges on 
weighing the disturbances  that movable exchange rates create for a 
common market  in goods, services, and capital  against  the advantages 
they confer  in helping  adjust  to various  kinds  of shocks. 
As a profession, economics has laid great  weight on the second item 
in that pair of issues and inadequate  weight on the first. In my view, 
currency  uncertainty  prevents  realization  of the  full  benefits  of a common 
market  in goods, services, and capital.  The importance  of the exchange 
rate  for adjustment  obviously  depends  on the nature  of the disturbances, 
and, in particular,  on whether  changes in an exchange  rate are useful in 
minimizing  the costs of adjusting  to them. 
Most economists, I believe, support  the use of exchange  rate  changes 
as a mechanism  of adjustment,  but  I am troubled  by the fact that  they do 
not typically carry the logic of that position to the breakup  of existing 
currency  areas where exactly the same underlying  reasoning  could be 
applied. I have not heard  serious argument  that the 12  different  dollars 
that we have in the United States-one  from each Federal Reserve 
district-should  be allowed to float against one another or that the 
Hamburg  mark  should be allowed to float against the Bavarian  mark, 
even though  during  the 1980s  a case could be made for either of these 
radical  changes. 
What are the disturbances that affect entire national economies? 
Giovannini  gives us one example. He shows that a world oil shock has 
remarkably  similar  effects in all European  countries.  That  surprised  me 
because  I would  have thought  Britain  was a sufficiently  large  oil exporter 
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up in the figures.  It makes me wonder  whether  his calculation  took the 
income  effect, as opposed to the relative  price  effects, into account. 
Anyway, I would suggest that the result generally holds for other 
worldwide  supply  shocks also, with  the possible  exception  of the United 
Kingdom  and oil. The European  economies do not differ much and, 
therefore,  exchange  rate  movements  among  them  are not terribly  useful 
in dealing  with external  supply  shocks. 
A second possible disturbance,  namely monetary  shocks, would be 
precluded  by the absence of different  central  bank  policies. 
A third potential source of disturbance-autonomous wage settle- 
ments-raises  the practical  question of whether the competitive pres- 
sures of the Common  Market  provide enough market  discipline with 
regard  to wage settlements to prevent radical differences in national 
wage settlements. In the presence of  such differences, changes in 
exchange  rates  might  offer  a useful adjustment  mechanism.  In a number 
of European  countries, unions are much weaker than they once were, 
but  I do not have much  more  specific  information  on the current  strength 
and  influence  of labor  organizations. 
Finally,  there  are  possible  fiscal  shocks. It is not accidental  that  much 
of the argument  for tighter fiscal discipline has been put forward  by 
central  bankers  and  their  fellow travelers,  because they see fiscal  policy 
as a major  potential  source of disturbance. 
In my view, only one general  rule is necessary, namely  that govern- 
ments not be able to turn  to the central  bank  for financing.  A common 
currency  implies a common monetary  policy. Members  can share the 
seigniorage  on some formula, but every government  has to go to the 
capital  market  to finance  its deficit. If the capital  market  is as good as I 
believe it is, that should  be sufficient.  The capital  market  exerts what I 
would call environmental  pressure  on fiscal policies, while, at the same 
time, preserving  some freedom  of action  for national  governments. 
Indeed,  it is useful in a common  currency  area  to have some freedom 
of action  on the fiscal  side. The tight  fiscal  rules  that  have  been proposed, 
and that are reflected  to some extent in the Delors report, are neither 
necessary  nor  desirable.  They are simply  a stumbling  block in the move 
toward  common  currency. 
Again, it is useful to draw  on the experience of the United States. It 
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some kind of budget-balancing  rules. But a close look at those rules- 
this is one of those instances in which the fine print becomes very 
important-reveals that in 13 states the rule simply says the governor 
must  submit  a balanced  budget  to the legislature. 
Thirty-six  states have some other  budget-balancing  rule. But sales of 
securities  in the capital  market  count as receipts, so states can balance 
budgets  by selling  securities.  Only 16  states  have rules  limiting  outstand- 
ing debt, a few of which are very tight. Ohio, for example, has a limit  on 
outstanding  public debt of $1 million. But most states have rather 
generous rules on outstanding  debt. So, while in fact most states have 
some formal  budgetary  rules, they do not seem to be very binding. 
At the same time, we do not see an active pursuit  of Keynesian-type 
fiscal policy by the states. The reason is that  the states are so open that 
the leverage  of fiscal policy on local activity is relatively  limited  unless 
the expenditure  is focused on particular  public  works projects,  which it 
tends to be. 
The surrogate  of fiscal policy in the U.S.  states is reliance on the 
highly  efficient  capital  market  and  provision  of incentives  for the inward 
flow of capital. I would expect to see the same dynamic operating  in 
Europe over the coming years, namely, a shift from reliance on fiscal 
policy as a stabilizer  in the traditional  Keynesian  sense to more  reliance 
on investment  incentives. Changes  in the structure  of European  econ- 
omies with an emphasis  on greater  openness will weaken the effective- 
ness of traditional  fiscal policy and increase the effectiveness of incen- 
tives used to attract  an inflow  of capital. 
I conclude with a radical  proposal. One of the problems  with fiscal 
policy in Europe  today  is that  among  EC  countries  there  is wide  variation 
of  outstanding public debt relative to  GNP. Giovannini's table 10 
excludes  Ireland  and  Denmark,  which  have  even higher  ratios  than  Italy. 
Even at common  interest  rates, therefore,  debt-servicing  burdens  vary 
sharply  from  country  to country.  To create a level fiscal playing  field at 
the time when a  European currency union is  created, all existing 
European  public debt ought to be consolidated as of a given date in 
Brussels. The consolidated  debt would become the future  obligation  of 
the European  Community  as a whole, and the national  capitals would 
be relieved  of it. 
This consolidation  would  have two advantages.  First, it would  create 
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situations  of countries.  Obviously,  differences  would  remain  because  of 
differences  in social security  and  other  expenditures,  but  gradually  some 
of those other  differences  will be harmonized  for other  reasons. 
Second,  the consolidation  would  create  in Brussels  a need  for  revenue 
for a purpose  other  than  the common  agricultural  policy, which  is a bane 
for almost everyone, including  the European  taxpayer.  It would create 
some competition  in Brussels for revenue. It would lay the foundation 
for a proper  fiscal system at the Europewide  level in order  to service the 
consolidated  debt. 
Again,  I draw  inspiration  from  the United  States. One  of the shrewdest 
moves that  was made  by George  Washington's  administration  under  the 
leadership  of Alexander  Hamilton  in the 1790s  was for the new United 
States of America  to assume all the debts of the 13 states. That  was the 
beginning  of the federal  fiscal system. Obviously, this proposal  is more 
likely to appeal to those who desire a future United States of Europe 
than  those who do not. 
Robert E. Hall: Whereas  Richard  Cooper  focused on the fiscal side of 
the successful  federal  structure  of the United States, I want  to talk  about 
the United  States  as a highly  successful  monetary  union.  There  is a close 
analogy between the present situation in Europe and the historical 
situation  in the United States from the end of the Revolutionary  War  in 
1781  to the ratification  of the U.S. Constitution  in 1788. 
After the war, the thirteen newly established states had thirteen 
separate  monetary  units  all called  pounds.  The American  currencies  did 
not circulate at par with the British pound, but floated far below the 
British unit and were unstable relative to each other. This monetary 
system was widely regarded  as chaotic. By the time the Constitutional 
Convention  met in 1787, it understood  that something  must be done. 
Thus, Article  I, section 8, of the Constitution  grants  Congress  the power 
to create a monetary  unit. And, it was soon after the adoption  of the 
Constitution  that  Congress  passed legislation  creating  the U.S. dollar,  a 
unit  that  had never  before  existed. 
Many things are being taken for granted  in the European  monetary 
union  that  were not taken  for granted  in 1787-88.  In particular,  the early 
Americans  understood  that  the only essential  step  in creating  a monetary 
unit is the purely intellectual  exercise of defining  the unit. In fact, the 
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create a unit of value also grants it the power to develop a system of 
weights  and measures.  At that  time, a unit  of value was simply  assumed 
to be a certain amount of precious metal, and so Congress adopted a 
bimetallic  definition  of the dollar  in 1791.  That  was all it did. 
That  turned  out to be a very useful application  of Congress's  power. 
It did not create a central  bank. It did not create any monetary  instru- 
ments. Indeed,  there  were no federal  government  monetary  instruments 
until  the Civil  War,  except for  during  the period  of the Bank  of the United 
States, which was not the same as what we have today and was an 
inessential part of the monetary system. Congress's action was an 
intellectual  intervention  in the economy, parallel  to setting  the length  of 
a yard  or the volume of a gallon. 
On the other  hand, Alberto  Giovannini's  paper  suggests that Europe 
today takes for granted  that  a conventional  central  bank-with reserves 
denominated  in a new monetary  unit  (which  I understand  might  be called 
the frankfort)-is the ultimate  goal of monetary  union. 
Monetary  policy would be executed by open-market  operations in 
member-government  securities  or  by obligations  of the European  central 
government.  Richard  Cooper solves this problem  by equating  the two. 
The central bank's portfolio would consist, on the asset side, of this 
hodgepodge  of government  securities  or central  European  government 
securities.  On  the liability  side, I believe there  would  be paper  currency, 
though  I haven't seen an extensive discussion  of this. Paper  currency  is 
more  important  in Europe  than  in  the United  States. (In  Europe,  payment 
by check or credit  card  is correspondingly  less important.)  There  would 
also be reserves. Although I do not believe there should be reserve 
requirements,  that is essentially a fiscal question. Should  the European 
central  government  raise revenue through  the holding  of more  reserves 
than would otherwise be held? In other words, should it tax through 
reserve  requirements? 
If one assumes  that  conventional  thinking  would  also mean  paying  no 
interest  on either  type of liability,  then the European  central  bank  would 
be a tremendous  money-maker.  The resulting  increase  in revenue  might 
be used to raise spending  on wasteful programs  such as the common 
agricultural  policy. Again,  I agree  with  Cooper's  remarks  that  a step that 
creates  a source  of revenue  for the central  European  government  should 
be avoided. 
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discuss some alternatives. The European central bank could instead 
have only reserves as liabilities and might grant individual  European 
governments  the power to issue currency  denominated  in the frankfort. 
This plan's advantage is that it denies the central government the 
seigniorage  from those securities  and returns  it to the member  govern- 
ments. 
I would also strongly  recommend  that the central  bank pay interest 
on its reserves. If it does so and pays close to market rates on the 
reserves, that would cancel the other source of revenue and make the 
central  bank more an intermediary  than a revenue-raiser.  Further,  the 
interest  rate  paid  on reserves might  become the instrument  of monetary 
policy. There is much  to be said for using an interest  instrument  rather 
than  a monetary-quantity  instrument.  The idea would  then be simply  to 
specify  the volume  of reserves  as a given. Presumably,  the volume  would 
be large if reserves pay close to market  rates, because the liabilities  of 
the central  bank  would be as attractive  as other short-term  government 
instruments.  Thus, the bank would use, as a policy instrument,  the 
differential  between the rate paid on reserves and open market  rates on 
similar securities. If the bank pays higher interest on reserves, the 
demand  for reserves rises, and there is deflationary  pressure.  To stimu- 
late the European  economy and raise prices, the central bank would 
increase  the differential  and  decrease the demand  for reserves. 
The interest rate differential  is, I think, an attractive way to run 
monetary  policy. It fits into what is highly desirable  in the context of 
monetary  union, elimination  of the central  bank as a fiscal agent. That 
is, this whole program  would eliminate  the rather  significant  amount  of 
taxation  that  currently  occurs through  central  banks. 
Individual  countries  would issue their own currencies,  which would 
be an element  of their  own national  debt. Small  denominations  of bearer 
debt would  be convertible  on demand  into the reserves of the European 
central  bank. Europe would then return  to the way in which the gold 
standard  worked  in later  years, when governments  issued similar  secu- 
rities  convertible  on demand  into gold. 
This  proposal  raises the interesting  possibility  that  any given govern- 
ment  could suspend  conversion.  There  has been a debate  in the econom- 
ics of the gold standard  as to whether  that is a bad or good thing. It is a 
bad  thing  in that  it reduces  the credibility  of the instruments.  It is a good 
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the present  case or misbehavior  of the gold market  under  the historical 
gold standard.  Also, it would retain an element of national  control if 
there was less-than-complete  faith in the quality of monetary policy 
being made by the central bank. If the central bank does  its job, 
suspension  by national  governments  would  be unlikely. 
These ideas deserve exploration  when discussing what the ultimate 
system should  look like. It should  not be taken  for granted  that  the goal 
of monetary  union is a European  central  bank that operates in exactly 
the same way as the Bundesbank  or the Federal Reserve. This is an 
opportunity  to think differently on this point and to generate more 
efficiency  in, and  better  performance  of, monetary  policy. 
General Discussion 
Some panelists discussed the persistent  positive return  achieved in 
recent years by investing in the French franc. Benjamin Friedman 
pointed  out that  the distribution  of returns  from  taking  a long position  in 
francs had "fatter tails" than would be expected if the returns were 
normally  distributed.  Hence, he was not surprised  that  the capital  asset 
pricing  model, which assumes normal  distributions,  underestimates  the 
risk premium. Alberto Giovannini  added that if investors in foreign 
exchange fear a disastrous but rare event, the actual return in most 
sample periods would exceed the expected return, which would take 
into  account  the possibility  of the disaster.  Hence, even if investors  were 
risk-neutral,  average sample returns would give the appearance  of a 
positive risk premium.  Similarly,  in a risk-averse  world  a risk premium 
estimated  from  average  sample  returns  would  have a high  probability  of 
exceeding its true  value. 
William  Brainard  noted that a risk premium  for an agent on one side 
of the foreign  exchange  market  is a risk  discount  on the other. Explana- 
tions of the risk premiums  therefore  require  information  about which 
side of the market  is "long." The assumption  that all individuals  have 
the same preferences  and endowments  makes  it difficult  to explain  why 
all agents  do not hold  the same  market  basket  of assets, and  why the risk 
characteristics  of assets look different  to agents  on opposite sides of the 
market. 
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be a United  States of Europe  from  the issue of currency  unification.  He 
argued  that  a common  currency  is an essential element  of what  it means 
to be a country:  historically, it has been rare  for one country to have 
more than one currency, or for one country to officially  use another's 
currency. In the case of the United States, he noted that the issue of 
monetary  union did not come up in isolation, but was dealt with in the 
First  Article  of the  Constitution.  Similarly,  Friedman  felt that  the impetus 
for a common  European  currency  was as much  a desire to move toward 
a United States of Europe as a desire to improve the operation  of the 
monetary  system. Richard  Cooper, while agreeing  that currency  unifi- 
cation was a symbolic issue in the current debate over political and 
economic unification, thought that it was important  to  make clear 
economic  arguments  for or against  currency  unification  and  also discuss 
the feasibility and potential value of currency unification  even in the 
absence of political unification. Although he believed that currency 
unification  in Europe  has great  merit,  he noted  that  it is quite  possible to 
have regional  influence  over economic policy even in politically  unified 
countries.  For example, U.S. states can and do collect their  own taxes, 
and  control  their  own expenditures.  Separate  state  or  regional  currencies 
should  be ruled  out on economic grounds  if they are  to be ruled  out. 
Martin Baily believed a common currency might have important 
consequences for the competitiveness  of labor  markets,  since it would 
undermine  the monopoly  power  of labor  unions.  Thus,  the  unions'  ability 
to affect  the internal  distribution  of income  would  be diminished.  Robert 
Lawrence, noting the author's analysis of the differential  effect on 
different  economies  of the oil price  shock, observed  that  a unified  Europe 
could face other shocks that might  create internal  disagreement  about 
economic policy. For example, appreciation  in the European  currency, 
like the appreciation  of the dollar in the early 1980s, will likely have 
disparate  effects on different  regions. In the United States, the dollar's 
rise led to differences in protectionist  pressures among regions of the 
country.  A unified  Europe  is likely to encounter  similar  divergences  in 
the wishes of the separate  states. 
Robert  Barro  suggested  that  the allocation  of seigniorage  was another 
consideration  in designing  a central monetary  authority.  He reasoned 
that  it was not desirable  to reward  countries  that had run large deficits 
and  gone heavily into debt. He therefore  suggested  that the amounts  of 
debt  assumed  by the central  authority  be proportional  to each country's 286  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
GNP, with the total amount  just sufficient  to absorb  the seigniorage  the 
central authority  would get from the issue of common currency. This 
scheme  would  use debt relief  to compensate  individual  countries  for the 
loss of their  seigniorage,  and  would  not redistribute  wealth  to the central 
authority. Alberto Giovannini  287 
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